Ethnic politics, ethnic violence

Kiserian, January 7, 2008

International media outlets produce large-type headlines: “Kenya could become another Rwanda” “Fears of ethnic violence grow” “Kenya sparks tribalism debate”

The clashes and rioting instigated by the outcome of the December 27, 2007, General Election have, in some cases, taken on an ethnic dimension. Leaders from both PNU and ODM camps have accused their opponents of directing ethnic cleansing. Rwanda, an obvious African example, is invoked. Yugoslavia, the counterpart of the politico-ethnic conflicts of 1990s Kenya, is not mentioned. Neither is a particularly good metaphor for the current situation in Kenya, but both are prominent in Western minds as repugnant outbreaks of senseless killing. Fear-mongering that Kenya could quickly turn into a wholesale genocidal slaughter may prompt swift reactions from an international community that has repeatedly vowed “Never Again.”

So far, the most obvious and disgusting case has been the torching of a Kenya Assemblies of God church in Eldoret. Inside, Kikuyu residents of the area, many of them children, sought refuge from violence targeted at them, simply on account of the fact that they share tribal identity with Mwai Kibaki, the controversially inaugurated, second-term President of the Republic. Many of them die. Burned alive. The Red Cross removed 17 bodies. Some reports say 30 dead, others 50, others as many as 100.

Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Wangari Maathai, herself a Kikuyu, is shown on television reading a prepared statement urging President Kibaki to speak out and make the first steps to resolve the conflict. People from her community, the Kikuyu, are being targeted because of their ethnicity based on the assumption that they are PNU and Kibaki supporters. This should not happen. In other places, attacks on Luo and people from other ethnic groups are being perpetrated on the assumption that they support ODM. This should not happen. Some of these fights are not about politics, or the election, but rather the current turn of events has allowed stress and frustration to be expressed in the form of burning houses and businesses and bleeding bodies.

People consistently express their shock that ethnic violence could erupt in Kenya, a peaceful and stable country. People insist that for years “we have all lived side-by-side, in peace, as neighbours and friends.” Thus, it is unimaginable that neighbours and friends, on the simple basis of their heritage, could begin to fight and kill one another. But it happens frequently.

In the early 1990s, linked to the reintroduction of multi-party politics through internal and external pressure, a series of violent clashes appeared along ethnic fault lines, especially in areas where 'outsiders' had been seen to 'immigrate' or 'encroach' into traditional territories of smaller groups. Around 1,500 died in a few years of sporadic outbreaks. Up to 500,000 more were displaced from their homes. Satisfactory resettlement has not yet occurred, 16 years later.

In the western part of Narok District, seemingly regular fights have broken out where Kipsigis are seen to be moving in to Maasai territory, competing for land and other resources. A friend who lives near Ololulung'a, the headquarters of the newly created Narok South District once told me that it happens about every three or four years. Someone starts a fight and young men from both sides are ferried into the area in pickup trucks, with pangas, clubs, and stones. Houses are burned, people displaced. And then the fighting stops and people go back to living beside or between one another.

On the eastern side of Narok District, it's not the Kipsigis but the Kikuyu who are seen to be encroaching. This has been a persistent political issue for at least 80 years. Maasai would be involved in several types of relationship with Kikuyu, either for the crops they produced, the fact that their daughters were available for marriage, or for their political support within the closed district. Other Maasai, no doubt with their own Kikuyu relatives, associates, and workers, would complain and raise calls for the eviction of Kikuyu from the district. They were ruining the environment, degrading Maasai culture, or trying to stand up on their own politically and economically, or so the complaints usually conveyed. A major fit of violence occurred along the north-eastern Narok boundary in 1993; as many as 30,000 Kikuyu fled across into what was then part of Nakuru District, and many of them are still there

In 2005, tensions between Maasai and Kikuyu broke wide open for a few days in Maai Mahiu and Suswa, further south along the Maasai-Kikuyu boundary and into Narok District. The trigger: a Kikuyu councilor had installed larger than agreed upon water pipes for an irrigation scheme on his land, diverting water away from the lowlands where Maasai pastoralists depend on it so their herds can drink. Both sides killed. Both sides lost people. In one of the most gruesome incidents, matatus were stopped in Maai Mahiu and passengers' ID cards inspected. If your name was obviously Maasai, you were killed. Similarly, in places like Ewuaso Nkidong'i and Empaash, Maasai chased and killed Kikuyu residents. Then the government, perceived by many as controlled by the Kikuyu tribe, and especially Internal Security Minister John Michuki, ordered troops deployed to quell the violence. A helicopter was sent up and a group of Maasai men mowed down from the air. There's no clear evidence they were involved in the fighting. Kikuyu shopkeepers and business people, and their families, packed their belongings and fled towns along the Narok road in fear for their lives. The fighting stopped after a few days, and eventually life went back to normal.

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Normal life in Kenya includes the issue of ethnicity. The country is diverse, with “more than 42” being the officially stated number of tribal groups, which includes at least two agglomerations of smaller, relatively independent units. Of those “more than 42” only five have more than ten percent of the total Kenyan population. The Kikuyu comprise more than twenty percent of all Kenyans. The Luo nearly fourteen. The Luhya, a group of some sixteen sub-tribes, makes up just fewer than the Luo. The Kamba, just more than ten. And the Kalenjin, which includes Nandi, Kispsigis, Tugen, Pokot, and others, just fewer than the Kamba. Each of these is the dominant group in one of Kenya's provinces. Kikuyu in Central, Luo in Nyanza, Luhya in Western, Kalenjin in Rift Valley, and Kamba in Eastern. Three of these five had presidential candidates in the 2007 election: Kikuyu – Kibaki, Luo – Odinga, Kamba -Musyoka. ODM, further, has a “Pentagon” of five main players from the Kalenjin, Luhya, Coastal, and Embu (closely related to the Kikuyu), along with others representing the Maasai, Kamba, and other ethnic groups. The Maasai, one of Africa's best-known tribal groups, comprises less than 1.5% of Kenya's population, and even when combined with their close cousins, the Samburu, does not surpass 2%.

The fact that there are ethnic groups is not, in itself, the cause of conflict in Kenya. The composition of the population, however, may be a contributing factor. David Horowitz, in his well-known book Ethnic Groups in Conflict, has argued that a population composed of a small number of large ethnic groups is a dangerous political situation as they are able to compete for control of state resources and power. A large number of small ethnic groups, on the other hand, is supposed to lead to a political situation in which no single group or coalition of groups can easily seize and keep hold of power. Kenya's political history is a strong piece of evidence for this theory.

No single community in Kenya can democratically capture the reigns of state power by itself, due to the combined demographic and democratic composition of the country. The constitution requires that to become president, a candidate must secure at least 25% of the popular vote in five of the eight provinces of the country, in addition to gaining the highest number of votes. Without support from members of different communities, no single leader can achieve this by relying on the votes of his own people.

Mwai Kibaki, then a candidate of the National Rainbow Coalition, was first elected president in December, 2002. Kibaki had been an important opposition leader since the reintroduction of multi-parties. He was effectively given the seat when Raila Odinga, another potential candidate declared “Kibaki Tosha” (Kibaki is enough) and stepped out of the internal Narc race. There had apparently been a Memorandum of Understanding crafted behind the scenes to unite leaders of different communities and defeat the Kenya African National Union, which had ruled the country since Independence in 1963. KANU's president, Daniel Moi, a Kalenjin, had agreed to step aside at the end of two constitutionally-amended terms of five years each. He chose Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu and son of the country's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, as his successor. Most people assumed that his choice had been part of an effort to protect himself from investigation over corruption allegations. Moi, it is sometimes said, was Africa's second richest man, behind only Mobutu of Zaire.

The Narc coalition came into power on a platform of anti-corruption and democratic change. People were tired of KANU and it's dirty politics and money-eating. While it was definitely present in the negotiations and campaiging, tribe seemed less an issue than more familiar to Western minds political issues such as good governance, economic growth, job creation, and nation-building.

Within months of the 2002 election, tribe had become important again. The MoU and Kibaki's promises broken, allegations abounded that he was stacking ministries and the civil service with Kikuyu, rather than appointing members of other communities. The defensive claim was that he was choosing the best qualified people. The counter was that there are educated, qualified people from every community, or at least the big ones, and that there was no good reason for such a high number of appointments to be going to the president's backyard.

Fears of Kikuyu dominance began to surface in many parts of the country. Once they got in, it was said, they had no intention of ever losing power again. The constitutional changes promised in the campaign were left by the wayside, and a bastardized version of the document produced through wide consultation with citizens and civil society put forward for referendum in 2005. Rather than reducing the powers of the president and creating a prime-minister's post, the status quo remained largely intact.

Tribe became an issue in the 2007 election as well. Some people say that the Narc coalition broke down into a number of tribal leaders all seeking the highest seat. While this appears to be the case superficially, with Kibaki, Raila, and Kalonzo each seeking the seat, the matter is more complex. Most of the allegations of tribalism came from Kibaki's PNU camp, with claims that ODM was not an election vehicle but an anti-Kikuyu machine. The counter claim was that Kikuyu will only raise concerns of tribalism when they are the victim. Both ODM and PNU carefully proclaimed that they would ensure benefits for 'all Kenyans.' Kibaki's billboards say “amani na maendeleo ya Wakenya Wote” (peace and development for all Kenyans); ODM t-shirts announced 'real change for all Kenyans.' Accusations of tribalism are a handy tool in a country that openly claims to hate the idea, yet continues to practice it.

ODM tried hard to campaign on issues. Corruption, governance reform, devolution of power. PNU countered by turning devolution into 'majimboism' a replay of the cries for ethnic federalism promoted by Kanu leaders in the early 1990s as a way to prevent Kikuyu hegemony. If ODM wins the election, it was claimed, Kikuyu across the country will be forcible returned to Central Province, their ancestral homeland. This despite the fact that many have been born in places like Narok, Kisumu, Mombasa, and elsewhere. ODM should have done more to counter this propaganda piece, especially considering that a significant number of their constituents would not disagree with the prospect and don't see any possibility of connection between freedom of movement and devolution of governance.

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Ethnicity in Kenya is a quiet issue. It is a constant undertone in political discourse. When fighting does break out between communities, leaders are always accused of fanning the flames of hatred. Curiously, when fighting started this year in Kuresoi Division, Molo District, it was regularly reported as 'ethnic violence' and connected to politics, but rarely, if ever, were the names of the communities involved mentioned. Given the history of the place, and the composition of the communities, it's almost certain that the fighting was between Kalenjin and Kikuyu.

Tribalism in Kenya could be divided into two main types. On one hand are preferential appointments and political dealings, along with the direction of the benefits of political position to one's own community. The other is a kind of simmering mistrust between ethnic groups. The two are connected in certain ways.

Political tribalism is in the upper levels of income and power in the country. Corruption goes on, contracts are awarded, funding diverted. Locally, community members and relatives benefit from this type of patronage, but by no means do all members of any one tribe benefit from these practices. In fact, blaming tribalism, and promoting the local level mistrust is a way of blinding people to the fact that Kenya is also riven by class divisions; the political and economic elite are inextricably linked, and the vast majority of Kenyans are not even remotely connected to their networks. For members of many communities, this is easily explained: the elite are Kikuyu and the rest are not. But this obscures the fact that leaders of all communities follow similar practices. During Moi's era, it was Kalenjin who benefited most, and the disconnection of Kikuyu from patronage networks was one of the driving factors behind the push for multi-party democracy. Maasai leaders are no exception to this. Fat bellies, large tracts of land, and successful businesses acquired and run under shady circumstances are a testament to this.

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Within the Maasai community, the other type of tribalism, the one most seated in local communities and informal discussions and drawn upon by political elites in times of need, is barely, or even rarely, hidden below the surface. Further, it is most often directed against the Kikuyu.

A drunken friend in Kiserian one day went on a rant. Kikuyu are rotten, dirty criminals, he told me. Just the other day, they had robbed him of his mobile phone and left him on the side of the road.

Another friend had his phone stolen while on a matatu riding to Kasarani area to the north of the city, on Thika road. Kikuyu, he said. Who else could it be?

When I drive through Dagoretti, Kikuyu town, Limuru, and Maai Mahiu on my way from Kiserian to Enoosupukia, I'm told by Maasai friends never to pick up strangers and to be especially careful, because the Kikuyu will rob me and kill me. If the car breaks down, I should call a mechanic from somewhere else to come help me, because the Kikuyu will cheat me, and then others will come to rob and kill me.

They're all crooks, I'm told. Not a single one who has an honest job or is safe to be around. They want your valuables. It easily progresses from muggings and robbery to buying up Maasai land through crooked deals.

When watching KBC news, or program credits, where names are shown, one friend of mine likes to point out that they're all Kikuyu, who can't even be bothered to give anyone else a job.

I assume that similar things occur in other communities, each with their own 'enemies,' but I haven't experienced it personally. It would be extremely surprising to find any ethnic group in the country without a significant number of members who subscribe to this kind of thinking.

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Maasai have a long history with Kikuyu. Sometimes they are called 'our in-laws', other times they are called 'our enemies.' Having neighboured one another for many decades, as Maasai controlled the Rift Valley and Kikuyu centred on the western slopes of Mt Kenya, they had many types of interaction. Trading of their livelihood products, marriage, especially of Kikuyu women and Maasai men, except in dire circumstances of severe drought or other problems. The Kikuyu, at one point, developed an age-set military system – generational standing armies – possibly modeled on that of the Maasai and other pastoralist peoples. If that theory is true, it was partly due to peaceful interaction and partly due to consistent raiding and conflict between the communities.

When the British came to colonize East Africa, the Maasai were eventually secluded into their reserves, while Kikuyu took advantage of education, opportunities to join the administration, and take on wage labour. Maasai, partly due to their leaders' conservatism, and partly due to British desire to contain, transform, or rid the world of them, for the most part did not engage in the same ways.

While Kikuyu were spreading out through the colony, especially on settler farms in the so-called White Highlands, Maasai mainly stayed on the reserve, practicing pastoralism and their culture. Of course there are exceptions to this. One of those is the emergence of an educated Maasai elite who were required by the government to attend school. Many of those have become political leaders, and some have been parliamentarians. Another exception is the agro-pastoral community in part of Narok District, which many Maasai claim is a livelihood change caused by the true ethnic identity of the people invovled: they must be Kikuyu, or at least 'half-caste.'

Just before independence, a contingent of Maasai walked out of the constitutional negotiations on the grounds that they required to have their lands, nearly half of their former empire, repatriated when the British left. This was not guaranteed by either the British or other Kenyan negotiators. Much of that land was slated for settlement of landless Kikuyu, whose population had grown beyond the capacity of Central Province, a key factor in the growth of the Land and Freedom Army, otherwise known as the Mau Mau.

Many of the White Highlands farms, which some Maasai wanted back from the British, were heavily populated with Kikuyu workers and their families. Some formed land-buying societies to purchase portions of the farms on which they worked from the white owners. Others were resettled by the Kenyatta government, with massive financial assistance from the British government. The Maasai, it seems, gained nothing in terms of land from independence, and now, rather than white colonizers, they saw Kikuyu occupying their ancestral lands and controlling the organs of government.

When questioned as to why freedom of movement is not inherently positive in Kenya, many Maasai will point out that while Kikuyu, and to a lesser extent Somali, are to be found everywhere throughout Maasailand, while you will never find a single Maasai living or working in Nyeri, Kiambu, or other parts of Central (I did, however, hear a Luo business owner call in to the radio from Nyeri the other day to say that no one has even thought to threaten him to move back to Kisumu). Freedom of movement, they argue, benefits only those who were protected by the government to move. In the first 16 years of independence, that was the Kikuyu, and by the time Moi came into power, they had established themselves throughout the republic. Now with Kibaki in place, there was no hope of getting rid of them or gaining back any of the land the Maasai had already lost. Similar complaints are raised in other parts of the Rift Valley, where Kikuyu are seen to have occupied lands once appropriated by the British from other tribes. The process continues with 'outsiders' buying land from locals who either have no options but to sell or are too easily convinced to make fast cash from land sales.

Land and ethnicity have been a useful tool for members of the political elite to stir up support. By promising to deal with those problems that continue to hinder development, Maasai leaders, not all, but a good number of them, gain great popularity. Similar strategies are employed by leaders from other communities. It seems that political tribalism in some way fuels popular tribalism, partly because political tribalism only increases poverty and hardship, partly because leaders of any given group point the finger of blame at leaders of other groups to explain to 'their people' why they must still struggle with poor or dilapidated infrastructure, shortages of teachers, medical care, and government services.

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With ethnicity used as a cover for class divisions, and Kenya disgraced with the honour of having one of the largest gaps between rich and poor, it seems a recipe for mass conflict and destruction, of the sort seen in Rwanda or Yugoslavia. It has yet to turn out that way.

While Yugoslavia's ethnic cleansing was part of an all-out civil war pitting factions of the military against one another, Rwanda's state-sponsored, organized, and executed genocide largely employed the average citizen. Kenyan ethnic clashes tend towards the Rwanda model, but they lack crucial elements of large-scale organization and planning, which, in a post-Rwanda era are highly unlikely to develop. Further, the Rwanda situation, where the elite of two ethnic groups of drastically different size competed for control of state power, has not yet been the case in Kenya.

While individual leaders, whether politically connected, such as Members of Parliament or local councilors, or simply local opinion leaders, including criminals and thugs (such as those involved with the Mungiki Sect – originally a 'traditionalist' Kikuyu gang, now verging on the status of organized crime), may in fact inspire, incite, or even arm hooligans to undertake ethnically targeted acts of violence, Kenya has yet to see anything even close to Rwanda's nearly institutionalized hatred and genocide. In fact, a major difference between recognized cases of genocide and the kind of 'tribal' skirmishes commonly seen in Kenya is the level of organization. If, as in Rwanda, a single ethnic group were in near total control of the government, and they used state and popular media to promote messages of hatred against other groups, and they instituted structures down to the neighbourhood level for monitoring the activities of 'politically incorrect' tribe members, there would be serious cause for concern.

Likewise, if the Kenyan state began to fragment into regions, and ethno-regional leaders fostered strong connections with the military, such that the military could easily be divided and convinced to fight against itself, there would be definite potential for Yugoslavia style 'ethnic cleansing', a term commonly employed in Kenya when fights flare up and call into question the socio-spatial distribution of Kenya's citizenry.

The type of ethnic conflict usually experienced in Kenya, local, low intensity, periodic outbreaks will not easily develop into large scale 'ethnic cleansing' or 'genocide.' That would require complicity or even planning by ethnic elites, participation of the military and security forces, and total ignorance by both internal and international observers. However, Kenya's brands of tribalism, and the periodic violence associated with it, will not easily disappear; even more difficult is the prospect of removing the growing class divisions which ethnicity is frequently used to hide.

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One of the complaints about political tribalism in Kenya is that the ruling ethnic group directs benefits back to their people, often in the form of development projects. Marginalized groups, and some are indeed more marginalized than others, often argue that the reason they have been left out, roads and other infrastructure neglected, hospitals built far away in some other group's 'home,' is that they do not have a representative, or a team of leaders, close to the reigns of power. This is not completely false, nor is it completely true. Ethnicity is only one factor in the uneven development of Kenya, geography, livelihood, and lack of sufficient resources to fully implement plans, along with corruption at all levels and by all manner of leaders and officials, are other contributors to the problem. Likewise, even if 'development' is seen to be given out preferentially, the fact remains that poverty and hardship crosses ethnic and geographic boundaries.

There are poor people in every community. Most of Kenya's rural population could be considered 'poor,' and indeed a percentage are considered to live in absolute poverty. Whether pastoralists, small-scale farmers, or 'former' hunter-gatherers, many people have been left out of the past five years of economic growth in Kenya. Some of the Kibaki government's achievements have been to revitalize parastatals, such as Kenya Cooperative Creameries and the Kenya Meat Commission, which will eventually bring great benefit to rural producers as the institutions grow and increase exports. Roads and electricity have been under repair and construction, slowly, very slowly, but surely. People don't dispute this record, but they do claim that infrastructure projects and the work of such parastatals is primarly targeted at certain areas, inhabited by certain communities, linked to certain major political figures. Whether this is intentional, political tribalism, or a combination of the slow pace of everything and a lack of sufficient funding to do it all at once in Kenya, is debatable, at least with most people.

In Nairobi's slums, among the biggest on the continent, there are representatives of many different ethnic groups. In Kibera, Mathare, Dandora, Huruma, there are Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya, and others. They are all struggling to make a living and to live a comfortable life, regardless of which politicians they support and which leaders are closer to the seat of power. Rural and urban, there is poverty here. Rural and urban, there are those who have become wealthy, sometimes to almost obscene levels, regardless of tribe.

Despite the differences in wealth within any given community, it is rare to hear people accuse members of their own community of appropriating common resources or misdirecting development resources away from the community and into their own pockets. More likely, from what I've seen and heard, is that 'others' are blamed. When they do recognize the growing class differences within their own communities, at least where Maasai are concerned, the member of the elite is often identified as 'really' a member of another tribe. At the same time, there is some sense that leaders have the right to take advantage of their position and enrich themselves. Rarely is the connection made that their self-enrichment might leave the rest of the community struggling to get ahead. Lands are grabbed, money captured, appointments handed out to friends and family. The children of the rich live in Nairobi, go to boarding schools, and are sometimes sent abroad for post-secondary education.

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Friday morning, while driving into town, I was listening to KISS 100, the most popular station among Kenyan youth, or at least those in and around Nairobi. The presenter was complaining that the riots and clashes are being portrayed in international media as tribal. True, she said, some people in some parts of the country had fought just because of tribal background, but Kenya is “not tribalistic! Kiukyu marry Luo, others marry different tribes, etc, etc” she said, her voice emphatic, totally rejecting the notion that ethnicity was an important factor in Kenyan social life.

This is not surprising. The key demographic for the station, and most likely the presenter herself, are part of a class of Kenyans sometimes referred to as the “Kenya tribe.” Not usually a self-ascription, they're most likely to consider themselves Kenyans, in the same way that citizens of many other nations choose nationality as their main identifier. A peculiar German I met in Nairobi once told me that this Kenya tribe was a horrible entity, stealing from the rest of the country's citizens who had remained true to their ethnicity. I suspect that, like all the other tribes in the country, the majority of “Kenya tribe” members are not actually crooks and embezzlers, even if they are lucky enough to experience the comforts of upper middle class existence.

A friend in Kajiado North, whose father is a Maasai and mother a Kikuyu told me recently that he prefers to identify himself as Kenyan, rather that as one or the other. He's a more urban, cosmopolitan fellow. In some of the more rural areas where I spend my time, people may employ different tribal labels, especially if they have mixed ethnicity, and even more so if they command multiple languages. In Maasai, most often children are identified by the ethnic background of their father. Thus, people with a Maasai father and Kikuyu mother would easily be called Maasai, even if they have a Kikuyu name and limited skill with the Maa language. When pressed, those same people might be identified as 'really' Kikuyu, or 'half-caste' (a rather ugly term, given its historical associations in other parts of Africa, but the common translation employed when people use English). People have long memories, and this may be partly due to the importance of kinship, clanship, and similar social relations. Even if they have to go back three or more generations to find the source of difference, people can often reveal that someone you assume is 'Maasai original' is really a Kikuyu, despite his livelihood, style of dress, body modifications, and use of language.

The Kenya tribe, however, is still a minority in the country, as are the rest of the country's ethnic groups. By no means are they a majority even in Nairobi, which may be considered their 'ethnic homeland.' Town is a very cosmopolitan place, with people from around the country, even around the world (plenty of major NGOs have their regional or continental headquarters here, including several branches of the UN). While their ranks will most likely grow over time, with more education, economic prosperity, and – though I dislike the word – 'modernization,' in rural areas and poorer neighbourhoods or larger towns and cities, tribe is likely to maintain its salience as a mode of organizing social relations. If people moving from rural to urban areas take up residence with or close to relatives or people from their 'home' areas, even when people from various ethnic groups and areas come to live in estates, slums, and neighbourhoods, tribe will remain an important criteria for identifying friends, spouses, and people on whom to depend in times of hardship.

The project of nation-building in Kenya, which has in some ways been thwarted by political and economic tribalism amongst the elite (or multiple elites), has a long ways to go, though the strongest reaction to the events of the past week have been to express shock and proclaim that Kenya is bigger than any single Kenyan. I haven't yet heard mention of Kenya being bigger than any single tribe, but perhaps that goes without saying. The potential to overcome popular tribalism in Kenya is probably largest in cosmopolitan centres, such as Nairobi, where no single ethnic group can easily claim an ancestral right. In other parts of the country, even where cosmopolitan centres spring up, there is often a local ethnic group, becoming more and more marginalized from economic and political gain as 'outsiders' move in, set up businesses, and take over local governance through rule by numbers. It is such places where the myth of nationalism seems thinnest.

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Calling Kenya's current situation one of ethnic cleansing, or even genocide, is on one hand a form of hyperbolic political rhetoric, directed against political rivals to try to discredit them in the eyes of both domestic and international audiences, whose attention has no become sharply focused on Kenya. In fact, despite many rumours about ethnic gangs and a few disgusting, but relatively isolated incidents, much of the displacement of various members of ethnic groups from their homes in areas where they're perceived to be 'outsiders' is about a sense of fear at the potential escalation of current looting and burning rampages. While Kenya's current crisis seems to be retaking its intended shape as a political crisis, there is no denying that an undercurrent of ethnic tension in the country has been exposed once again.

Unfortunately, if the trend continues, that current will once again sink below the surface, hidden from immediate consciousness, but ever present. As far as long-term change and solution of the 'ethnic problem,' this may be the worst thing that can happen. Once the violence has subsided, business returns to normal, and people rebuild their houses and lives, Kenya's ethnic tension will once again be a deniable feature of social life here. Political, elite tribalism will continue to exist, and eventually public complaints will be made once again. Popular tribalism will also continue to exist, exposing itself in the form of jokes about the stereotypes of various ethnic groups, or in drunken or angry rants. This is unfortunate because, rather than moving the country towards a more sustainable peace built around a multi-ethnic society, it will return Kenya to an unsteady truce built around the myth of nationality, which is relevant to only a small portion of the population, themselves mainly an elite class. These fault lines, unproblematic as long as they remain dormant, will inevitably flare up when pressure at the local and national level align leading to localized skirmishes, destruction of property and life through a kind of normalized mass murder in which each side spills and loses blood.

Keeping ethnicity in the closet, as it were seems to be a product of the fear of what might happen, based on the example of other countries both in Africa and around the world. And in a way, perhaps maintaining an almost institutional silence about the issue does prevent it from getting out of hand; when tensions build, sporadic eruptions relieve them, in a less destructive way overall than a cataclysmic event such as genocide or civil war. But I wonder at the possibility of opening Kenya's ethnic stresses for inspection and resolution. Raila and ODM have been pushing the idea of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation for Kenya, mainly with regard to cases of grand corruption, but also linked to some of the land issues that have been perpetrated over more than 100 years.

That kind of process can not be easy, and will necessarily be painful for many involved, both those guilty of taking advantage and those who have lost out. It may be, however, that controlled release of tension, channeling the usual stress away from violent outbursts and towards mutual understanding and forgiveness, could both strengthen the nation and allow for more constructive ethnic pride. This, of course, requires the willingness of both elite and average Kenyans, and an ability to confront ethnicity openly. Undoubtedly, for many people it is easier to sweep the pain away and forget about it until the next ugly incident occurs, reminding citizens that Kenya is indeed a divided society.

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There have been allegations that the 'ethnic' violence witnessed in places such as Eldoret, perhaps Narok, and elsewhere has been a result of people targeting Kikuyu residents because of their ethnic connection with the inaugurated president and his clique of advisers. This rings somehow hollow. It is true that there are some, maybe even many, Kenyans who would apply the adage 'when in Rome, do as the Romans do' to politics, demanding that 'outsiders' vote for 'locals' or the preferred candidates of locals in any and all elections. However, the main political issue in the aftermath of the 2007 General Election has not been that 'outsiders' overpowered 'locals' at the polls, electing their own representatives from bottom to top. Rather, the political issue has been rigging of the final presidential tally at the ECK headquarters in Nairobi, after accurate results were announced, first at each polling station and then at each constituency tallying centre. To conflate the residents who may or may not have voted for Kibaki and his allies with the criminal elite which assumed Kenyans, and especially the opposition were too ignorant or complacent to notice what was going on is a particular brand of intellectual blindness, and it may also be part of the problem. The more central problem, and the one which threatens to hinder Kenya's growth and internal peace, is the chronic popular tribalism combined with political and economic tribalism which is so easily ignored or denied until it blows up in the face of the nation.

With longer-term, localized conflicts, such as the ones in Mt Elgon, and this year in Kuresoi, it is too easy to pass them off as anomalies rather than recognizing them as symptoms of a systematic social illness whose root causes need to be addressed for Kenya to become a healthy nation. Perhaps this particular reminder, coming suddenly and breaking out in geographically distant places, will push the country past the convenience of forgetting.