Another one from the BBC, which is now reporting that key people in Kibaki's government called on the Mungiki to 'protect' Kikuyu residents in the Rift Valley. The article alleges that Mungiki leaders were called to official government offices by senior people in the administration and given the duty to head down to various Rift Valley towns to carry out attacks on non-Kikuyu living there. The pattern certainly seems to fit something like that, especially the wave of battles in Nakuru and Naivasha in late January. Other Mungiki sources are saying that it was a renegade faction which carried out those activities, and not the main group. That's not a great sign, if indeed it's true, that Mungiki is decentralized enough for factions to be used by different people in different ways. It's the kind of situation that could create a kind of Kikuyu civil war if left unchecked. Of course, there are many Kenyans who would say 'fine, let them kill themselves' as they did when the government was waging open war on Mungiki in mid-2007, but those Kenyans would then be choosing to ignore the risk to national stability...
Now, I expect it will only be a matter of time before similar, very specific claims are made with regard to ODM and the gangs which carried out some of the earlier violence in places like Eldoret, if in fact they haven't already been made. The vague allegations have certainly been published already.
On one hand, it would be great to try to pursue charges against any leaders who are found to have done something like this. Whether it's PNU/Kikuyu leaders and Mungiki, or any others, it's an important aspect of the potential for ethnic conflict in Kenya, and if it's taken away, it will be harder for such clashes to go on without people being held accountable.
On the other hand, going after political leaders as the main cause of ethnic conflict in Kenya is both an easy way out and a way to ensure that nothing really changes. Kenya, the state, has repeatedly shown itself unwilling or unable to actually prosecute leaders who mobilize or utilize ethnicity to promote or carry out violence for political ends. The legacy of the clashes of the 1990s is a testament to this. Further, going after political elites and/or telling them they need to be responsible and not take advantage of the conducive situations for such political uses of ethnicity (as was done in the Akiwumi Commission's report on tribal clashes), ignores the fact that something must be done about those conducive situations.
To simply ask politicians, and threaten them with incarceration or fines, or whatever other measures of censure might be used, to resist inciting people along ethnic lines, especially when they rely on their communities for votes in every election, is yet another way of keeping deeper problems locked in the closet. The rattling bones of the giant skeleton of ethnicity, land disputes, and poverty will not simply disintegrate when politicians stop mentioning them in public. Ordinary Kenyans are not mindless followers who will just agree when politicians fabricate greivances or ethnic animosities. Nor will they simply forget their history, and the many legitimate complaints they have which sometimes derive from the past indulgences of leaders taking advantage of state power for the benefit of their patronage networks.
The most serious mistake that the government can make in the next few months would be to set up a system of dealing with this round of violence and politics without making any provisions for finally trying to open the debates about what many Kenyans call 'historical greivances' and which date back as far as the colonization of East Africa by the British.
Wednesday, March 5, 2008
Thursday, February 28, 2008
Let's make a deal
Montreal, February 28
More news today, bringing a sigh of relief. The power sharing deal has been signed in a public ceremony. The basics are that the each party will get cabinet posts reflecting its numbers in parliament, and there will be a Prime Minister (for the first time since 1964) and two Deputy PMs. The PM will, according to the report: have "authority to co-ordinate and supervise the execution of government functions". A little vague.
Great first step, and only two months overdue.
Well, actually, more like 10 years overdue, but that's a whole other story.
I fully expect Kenya to recede from international headlines now, as it had already done to a large extent because there was no sexy violence going on for reporters to cover. What this will mean for the rest of a program of reform is very unclear.
In a way, I don't imagine Kenyan leaders moving forward or making much progress without international pressure to keep things going. There's a lot of opportunity to just stall and stall and stall, unless at least one of the main players (I'll speculate, optimistically, that it'll be ODM) keeping up the pressure and using its position to leverage some of the reforms they want to make.
As far as violence goes, it remains to be seen how well this political agreement will be received by the masses, and by the makeshift and not so makeshift ethnic gangs that carried out a lot of the attacks. If they see it as a reasonable agreement, things should remain calm and get better. If, for some reason, either side sees it as threatening their position (and I would speculate that this might come from Kibaki's "supporters"), we might see more clashes. I think it's unlikely in the short term, but what do I know?
I suppose the image of Raila and Kibaki, Luo and Kikuyu, agreeing to work and live together is a positive one for Kenya.
Without further reform, this deal will essentially be meaningless.
More news today, bringing a sigh of relief. The power sharing deal has been signed in a public ceremony. The basics are that the each party will get cabinet posts reflecting its numbers in parliament, and there will be a Prime Minister (for the first time since 1964) and two Deputy PMs. The PM will, according to the report: have "authority to co-ordinate and supervise the execution of government functions". A little vague.
Great first step, and only two months overdue.
Well, actually, more like 10 years overdue, but that's a whole other story.
I fully expect Kenya to recede from international headlines now, as it had already done to a large extent because there was no sexy violence going on for reporters to cover. What this will mean for the rest of a program of reform is very unclear.
In a way, I don't imagine Kenyan leaders moving forward or making much progress without international pressure to keep things going. There's a lot of opportunity to just stall and stall and stall, unless at least one of the main players (I'll speculate, optimistically, that it'll be ODM) keeping up the pressure and using its position to leverage some of the reforms they want to make.
As far as violence goes, it remains to be seen how well this political agreement will be received by the masses, and by the makeshift and not so makeshift ethnic gangs that carried out a lot of the attacks. If they see it as a reasonable agreement, things should remain calm and get better. If, for some reason, either side sees it as threatening their position (and I would speculate that this might come from Kibaki's "supporters"), we might see more clashes. I think it's unlikely in the short term, but what do I know?
I suppose the image of Raila and Kibaki, Luo and Kikuyu, agreeing to work and live together is a positive one for Kenya.
Without further reform, this deal will essentially be meaningless.
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
Communication breakdown
Montreal, February 26
The BBC is reporting that the mediation talks in Kenya have been suspended. This is not altogether unexpected, given that the discussions which seemed to be proceeding so well over the past couple of weeks hit some serious snags over the past seven to ten days. The main sticking point, it appears, is the powers to be associated with a new position of Prime Minister, and how that person is to be selected.
The ODM wants an executive prime minister, whose job will be created through a constitutional amendment, and who will be selected through General Election (that is, the leader of the party with the most seats in Parliament will automatically become the PM). They want this person to have a fair amount of power in directing government business in Parliament, just like many other PMs around the world, which would remove some of the executive powers from the imperial Presidency that Kenya currently has in place.
The PNU disagrees with this, and while they apparently agreed to the creating of a PM post last week, they have argued that the PM should be a simple cabinet member, to be appointed (and fired) by the President, more or less at will. This, they say, should be done through a simple act in Parliament.
Kofi Annan, trying to reassure everyone involved (including those of us keeping score at home), has said that the talks have not 'broken down' but that he has temporarily suspended discussions so he can meet directly with Raila and Kibaki to try to move things along more quickly than their negotiating teams will allow.
ODM, meanwhile, has called for mass, peaceful, public demonstrations to be held on Thursday. They made the call late last week when it looked like talks were going to get seriously bogged down on the power-sharing issue, and formally notified the police on Monday evening. Now, from what I can tell, there should be no reason for the police to disallow the protests, since the blanket ban on political meetings appears to have been withdrawn, and the ODM have followed the necessary steps by providing notice three days in advance. Of course, a protest in Kenya, even if it's intended to be peaceful, is a risky proposition for public safety and maintaining order. Whether thugs from either side will try to use the mob effect to stir up serious trouble, or the police decide to bust things up for no apparent reason, things could easily get out of hand. Let's hope they don't. It's time to start a new precedent in public demonstrations in Kenya anyways.
This whole situation is a bit absurd.
First of all, ODM and Raila are basically negotiating to get themselves a stake in governing the country with a regime that effectively stole the election. At first, it seemed to be about trying to come up with a resolution to the crisis that would likely see a short-term transitional phase to oversee constitutional reform and a new election. Now the transitional aspect of it seems to be more in doubt.
Second, Raila and ODM appear to be basically willing to settle for a Prime Minister's post, if it has enough executive power and is entrenched by a constitutional amendment, despite earlier having rejected outright the possibility of even entertaining an offer. That's fine, I suppose, but they have to know that unless things are done quickly and with enough legal weight to make them stick, there's a pretty good chance that Kibaki and his team will do what they did in 2003: break the agreement at the earliest opportunity and continue to make use of their power as they have been.
If these negotiations actually lead to fundamental, constitutional change in Kenya, Raila and ODM accepting the creation of an executive Prime Minister would be a potentially positive step. That would be better than having the presidential results overturned (or annuled) and then taking up office to perpetuate the same intentional neglect to effect reforms that Kenya saw after the NARC coalition came to power in 2003. But, if the PMship is being used as a tool to bring Raila into the fold of PNU, so to speak, and if he goes along with it, he will have proven once and for all that he's no better than the rest of the so-called leaders who have brought this crisis upon their people.
Meanwhile, if talks actually do break down, rather than being slowed down as Annan says, there's a very real threat of renewed violence. The uneasy calm that has prevailed since the beginning of February has given the ethnically oriented gangs of youth time to recharge their batteries. In a worst case scenario, they will also have taken the time to organize and prepare.
The first step to lasting peace and reform in Kenya is to prevent the thugs and gangs from getting an opportunity to cause further damage. That will require the 'leaders' to strengthen their resolve to solve the political crisis so that they can go on to the next steps: constitutional reform and a truth and reconciliation effort that goes as far back in time as necessary to deal with the root causes of these conflicts. The question is, can Kibaki and his team put their death-grip on power aside for the good of the nation, and can Raila and his team show a level of integrity that forces PNU to do so?
The BBC is reporting that the mediation talks in Kenya have been suspended. This is not altogether unexpected, given that the discussions which seemed to be proceeding so well over the past couple of weeks hit some serious snags over the past seven to ten days. The main sticking point, it appears, is the powers to be associated with a new position of Prime Minister, and how that person is to be selected.
The ODM wants an executive prime minister, whose job will be created through a constitutional amendment, and who will be selected through General Election (that is, the leader of the party with the most seats in Parliament will automatically become the PM). They want this person to have a fair amount of power in directing government business in Parliament, just like many other PMs around the world, which would remove some of the executive powers from the imperial Presidency that Kenya currently has in place.
The PNU disagrees with this, and while they apparently agreed to the creating of a PM post last week, they have argued that the PM should be a simple cabinet member, to be appointed (and fired) by the President, more or less at will. This, they say, should be done through a simple act in Parliament.
Kofi Annan, trying to reassure everyone involved (including those of us keeping score at home), has said that the talks have not 'broken down' but that he has temporarily suspended discussions so he can meet directly with Raila and Kibaki to try to move things along more quickly than their negotiating teams will allow.
ODM, meanwhile, has called for mass, peaceful, public demonstrations to be held on Thursday. They made the call late last week when it looked like talks were going to get seriously bogged down on the power-sharing issue, and formally notified the police on Monday evening. Now, from what I can tell, there should be no reason for the police to disallow the protests, since the blanket ban on political meetings appears to have been withdrawn, and the ODM have followed the necessary steps by providing notice three days in advance. Of course, a protest in Kenya, even if it's intended to be peaceful, is a risky proposition for public safety and maintaining order. Whether thugs from either side will try to use the mob effect to stir up serious trouble, or the police decide to bust things up for no apparent reason, things could easily get out of hand. Let's hope they don't. It's time to start a new precedent in public demonstrations in Kenya anyways.
This whole situation is a bit absurd.
First of all, ODM and Raila are basically negotiating to get themselves a stake in governing the country with a regime that effectively stole the election. At first, it seemed to be about trying to come up with a resolution to the crisis that would likely see a short-term transitional phase to oversee constitutional reform and a new election. Now the transitional aspect of it seems to be more in doubt.
Second, Raila and ODM appear to be basically willing to settle for a Prime Minister's post, if it has enough executive power and is entrenched by a constitutional amendment, despite earlier having rejected outright the possibility of even entertaining an offer. That's fine, I suppose, but they have to know that unless things are done quickly and with enough legal weight to make them stick, there's a pretty good chance that Kibaki and his team will do what they did in 2003: break the agreement at the earliest opportunity and continue to make use of their power as they have been.
If these negotiations actually lead to fundamental, constitutional change in Kenya, Raila and ODM accepting the creation of an executive Prime Minister would be a potentially positive step. That would be better than having the presidential results overturned (or annuled) and then taking up office to perpetuate the same intentional neglect to effect reforms that Kenya saw after the NARC coalition came to power in 2003. But, if the PMship is being used as a tool to bring Raila into the fold of PNU, so to speak, and if he goes along with it, he will have proven once and for all that he's no better than the rest of the so-called leaders who have brought this crisis upon their people.
Meanwhile, if talks actually do break down, rather than being slowed down as Annan says, there's a very real threat of renewed violence. The uneasy calm that has prevailed since the beginning of February has given the ethnically oriented gangs of youth time to recharge their batteries. In a worst case scenario, they will also have taken the time to organize and prepare.
The first step to lasting peace and reform in Kenya is to prevent the thugs and gangs from getting an opportunity to cause further damage. That will require the 'leaders' to strengthen their resolve to solve the political crisis so that they can go on to the next steps: constitutional reform and a truth and reconciliation effort that goes as far back in time as necessary to deal with the root causes of these conflicts. The question is, can Kibaki and his team put their death-grip on power aside for the good of the nation, and can Raila and his team show a level of integrity that forces PNU to do so?
Thursday, February 7, 2008
Stalemate
Montreal, February 7
The political stalemate continues in Kenya. After easy agreement on the fact that there's a humanitarian crisis in the country, the Kofi Annan mediation extravaganza hit a major roadblock (no burning tires or machetes here) by trying to address the elections. ODM says it was stolen, wants a change, and is suggesting a transitional government of some sort. PNU says there's no problem and ODM should have gone to court (but has now missed the opportunity because they didn't file a petition before the deadline to do so), and is refusing any suggestion of a re-run or a transition. They did, however, agree that there are fundamental problems with the Electoral Commission of Kenya which need to be addressed. Great work fellas.
What seems absurd, at the moment, is that people seem to believe that these same politicians can somehow control the 'rowdy youths' who periodically erect blockades or chase people from other tribes in (and out of) various rural parts of the country. It seems to me, watching from a distance as I am, that the politicians have little to no control over what goes on on the ground.
True, it would make a difference if they continued to promote peace and speak out against violence. That might convince some of the fence-sitters among the youth not to join in on fighting when it erupts. But the hardcore, some of whom may well be directed as parts of gangs which are controlled at the local level or more or less independently from the politicians who are almost always linked to them by rumour and innuendo, will not easily be swayed by words.
The underlying problems, tensions over resources that should be more linked to class and less linked to ethnicity, need to be addressed, and assuming that the political elite is in control of 'supporters' who are then sent out to attack opponents or 'enemies' will not help the situation. That's the legacy of the ethnic clashes of the 1990s, which were passed off as politically instigated and orchestrated while it should have been clear to almost everyone that it was not simply a matter of politicians running militias (although that was there, too), but far more complex.
Until Kenya sorts out the deeper issues, the potential for repeated explosions along ethnic lines, such as those that have happened over the past several weeks, will continue to exist.
The political stalemate continues in Kenya. After easy agreement on the fact that there's a humanitarian crisis in the country, the Kofi Annan mediation extravaganza hit a major roadblock (no burning tires or machetes here) by trying to address the elections. ODM says it was stolen, wants a change, and is suggesting a transitional government of some sort. PNU says there's no problem and ODM should have gone to court (but has now missed the opportunity because they didn't file a petition before the deadline to do so), and is refusing any suggestion of a re-run or a transition. They did, however, agree that there are fundamental problems with the Electoral Commission of Kenya which need to be addressed. Great work fellas.
What seems absurd, at the moment, is that people seem to believe that these same politicians can somehow control the 'rowdy youths' who periodically erect blockades or chase people from other tribes in (and out of) various rural parts of the country. It seems to me, watching from a distance as I am, that the politicians have little to no control over what goes on on the ground.
True, it would make a difference if they continued to promote peace and speak out against violence. That might convince some of the fence-sitters among the youth not to join in on fighting when it erupts. But the hardcore, some of whom may well be directed as parts of gangs which are controlled at the local level or more or less independently from the politicians who are almost always linked to them by rumour and innuendo, will not easily be swayed by words.
The underlying problems, tensions over resources that should be more linked to class and less linked to ethnicity, need to be addressed, and assuming that the political elite is in control of 'supporters' who are then sent out to attack opponents or 'enemies' will not help the situation. That's the legacy of the ethnic clashes of the 1990s, which were passed off as politically instigated and orchestrated while it should have been clear to almost everyone that it was not simply a matter of politicians running militias (although that was there, too), but far more complex.
Until Kenya sorts out the deeper issues, the potential for repeated explosions along ethnic lines, such as those that have happened over the past several weeks, will continue to exist.
Tuesday, January 29, 2008
The tough decision
Montreal, January 29
Over the weekend, I had to make one of the most difficult decisions I've faced in my life. Looking back at it from so close, it seems rather self-evident that this was the choice I'd have to make, but at the time, it was not clear to me at all.
When I met my supervisor on Friday, after hearing about the attacks in Nakuru and the fresh eruption of violence, I resigned myself to delaying my return to Kenya by a week or two, just enough time to let things settle down enough so I could get back to my research. It still looked like the 'leaders' were heading towards some sort of political solution (and maybe it still does, since Kofi Annan is still in the country, trying to bring the sides into negotiations). I made a quick call to my travel agent, who then informed me I could get a waiver on the flight change fees and make my return later.
By Sunday afternoon, things had become more serious, and far more sad. Over Saturday night, Naivasha began to experience the same kind of revenge attacks and assertions of control that Nakuru had seen over the previous few days. Fighting started in Karagita, a bedroom community of sorts, on the road between Naivasha and Kongoni, which I use to travel between Nairobi and my field site in the Mau Hills. I hoped it would simply be a riot and looting escapade. Phone calls from a colleague in London, where she had to go to get away before tensions burst in Naivasha, relaying information about what was going on convinced me that it wouldn't just fizzle out. By Monday morning, media were reporting more than 20 dead and countless injured, including at least two incidents in which fleeing families were burned alive in their homes.
The email from my supervisor suggested that I adopt a radical alternative plan. I should, he suggested, plan to stay here in Montreal until after my unalterable obligation in June, and only then return to Kenya to continue my field research. While here, I could begin writing my thesis, and devolop a focused plan of research for when I go back. Academically, the benefits are pretty obvious; I have the chance to spend time figuring out what I wish I'd done and asked over the past 10 months and then go do and ask it later (without having to apply my way into a post-doc!). From Nairobi, this would be difficult, if not impossible, and I would have the fixed end-date in late June looming over me, pressuring me, encouraging bad decisions.
Personally, and emotionally, none of it was obvious. I've spent months making friends, falling in love with communities and places, and letting Kenya take over a part of my being. I know there's not much I could do from inside Kenya, but there would be some comfort in at least being in the country, on the scene, with my friends. There's also an overwhelming sense of guilt that I am able to simply leave Kenya, even though my choice to leave was not made on the basis of the election fallout. Why do I get to enjoy this luxury of freedom and peace, while others risk their lives, basically due to accidents of birth.
I have now become more accustomed to the idea that I'll be spending five or six months back in Canada. It will be a challenge to sit here and watch, wait, and wonder if peace will return to Kenya, if my friends will all survive until I get the chance to see them again, if there will be any move towards a short-term resolution, let alone a long-term solution to the underlying problems that have led Kenya to the brink of collapse. All I can do for the moment is hope that the violence does not spread any further towards the communities in which I have lived. That the young and brave Dorobo and Maasai men whom I have spent time with, and their elders, have the wisdom to keep from rushing into battle before attempting to maintain peace. That others are not stupid enough to direct their rage and aggression towards a community that will gladly fight to protect themselves. That the so-called leaders whose actions have spawned this beast have the humility and courage to act now before more Kenyans die, before the country is reduced to ruins.
----
Breaking news from Nairobi. The MP for Embakasi, Mugabe Were of the ODM has been gunned down outside his home. He was attacked by at least two men with guns and shot in the head and chest while he waited to drive into his compound. The police are calling it a murder, and have not ruled out political motives. I'm disgusted that another death has resulted from greed for political power, but I'm thankful that it wasn't a higher profile politician. Still, the fallout from this news will be disastrous, and I hope that this will make the elite realize they are not simply playing with the lives of the common Kenyan, but that they too are in grave danger, increasing with every day that this political stalemate continues. How many more must die before someone blinks?
Over the weekend, I had to make one of the most difficult decisions I've faced in my life. Looking back at it from so close, it seems rather self-evident that this was the choice I'd have to make, but at the time, it was not clear to me at all.
When I met my supervisor on Friday, after hearing about the attacks in Nakuru and the fresh eruption of violence, I resigned myself to delaying my return to Kenya by a week or two, just enough time to let things settle down enough so I could get back to my research. It still looked like the 'leaders' were heading towards some sort of political solution (and maybe it still does, since Kofi Annan is still in the country, trying to bring the sides into negotiations). I made a quick call to my travel agent, who then informed me I could get a waiver on the flight change fees and make my return later.
By Sunday afternoon, things had become more serious, and far more sad. Over Saturday night, Naivasha began to experience the same kind of revenge attacks and assertions of control that Nakuru had seen over the previous few days. Fighting started in Karagita, a bedroom community of sorts, on the road between Naivasha and Kongoni, which I use to travel between Nairobi and my field site in the Mau Hills. I hoped it would simply be a riot and looting escapade. Phone calls from a colleague in London, where she had to go to get away before tensions burst in Naivasha, relaying information about what was going on convinced me that it wouldn't just fizzle out. By Monday morning, media were reporting more than 20 dead and countless injured, including at least two incidents in which fleeing families were burned alive in their homes.
The email from my supervisor suggested that I adopt a radical alternative plan. I should, he suggested, plan to stay here in Montreal until after my unalterable obligation in June, and only then return to Kenya to continue my field research. While here, I could begin writing my thesis, and devolop a focused plan of research for when I go back. Academically, the benefits are pretty obvious; I have the chance to spend time figuring out what I wish I'd done and asked over the past 10 months and then go do and ask it later (without having to apply my way into a post-doc!). From Nairobi, this would be difficult, if not impossible, and I would have the fixed end-date in late June looming over me, pressuring me, encouraging bad decisions.
Personally, and emotionally, none of it was obvious. I've spent months making friends, falling in love with communities and places, and letting Kenya take over a part of my being. I know there's not much I could do from inside Kenya, but there would be some comfort in at least being in the country, on the scene, with my friends. There's also an overwhelming sense of guilt that I am able to simply leave Kenya, even though my choice to leave was not made on the basis of the election fallout. Why do I get to enjoy this luxury of freedom and peace, while others risk their lives, basically due to accidents of birth.
I have now become more accustomed to the idea that I'll be spending five or six months back in Canada. It will be a challenge to sit here and watch, wait, and wonder if peace will return to Kenya, if my friends will all survive until I get the chance to see them again, if there will be any move towards a short-term resolution, let alone a long-term solution to the underlying problems that have led Kenya to the brink of collapse. All I can do for the moment is hope that the violence does not spread any further towards the communities in which I have lived. That the young and brave Dorobo and Maasai men whom I have spent time with, and their elders, have the wisdom to keep from rushing into battle before attempting to maintain peace. That others are not stupid enough to direct their rage and aggression towards a community that will gladly fight to protect themselves. That the so-called leaders whose actions have spawned this beast have the humility and courage to act now before more Kenyans die, before the country is reduced to ruins.
----
Breaking news from Nairobi. The MP for Embakasi, Mugabe Were of the ODM has been gunned down outside his home. He was attacked by at least two men with guns and shot in the head and chest while he waited to drive into his compound. The police are calling it a murder, and have not ruled out political motives. I'm disgusted that another death has resulted from greed for political power, but I'm thankful that it wasn't a higher profile politician. Still, the fallout from this news will be disastrous, and I hope that this will make the elite realize they are not simply playing with the lives of the common Kenyan, but that they too are in grave danger, increasing with every day that this political stalemate continues. How many more must die before someone blinks?
Monday, January 28, 2008
Blood flows, houses burn, and politicians sit idly by
Montreal, January 27
I am feeling sick to my stomach as I read news reports that chaos has spread to the Naivasha from Nakuru. Houses are being torched, people hacked with machetes or beaten with clubs, and roadblocks erected on the main highway to single out people from a 'certain community.' In this case, that certain community appears to be anyone perceived to support the ODM and oppose Kibaki and the PNU. These are revenge attacks being organized, most likely by local gangs of young men, and they represent a new wave of violence in the aftermath of the election.
Naivasha has the potential to be a horrible powder-keg. While the area has come to be dominated by Kikuyu labourers and small-farmers, many of them descendants of migrants who left their ancestral area for work on white-owned farms during the colonial era, it is also diverse. People from many parts of Kenya have been drawn to Naivasha because of the presence of a cut-flower industry which supplies up to 1/3 of the flowers for the global market in Holland. Thousands of workers have flooded in over the past few decades, along with their families who struggle to make ends meet. To add to the problem, the whole area is considered by the Maasai – who mainly live within the boundaries of the former colonial reserve to which they were displaced by white settlement – as Maasailand, which is historically true. A fellow researcher who has been carrying out fieldwork in the area told me that she thought the Kikuyu around Naivasha would be hesitant to take up arms (of whatever sort) because of the very real possibility of drawing in the Maasai, who many of them fear. Over this weekend, that fear appears to have been pushed far enough aside for action to have been taken.
I have yet to hear direct news from the area, and have not seen reports of Kikuyu attacks on Maasai, but there are many reports of Kikuyu gangs attacking Luo, Luhya, and other residents of the Naivasha area. One particularly disgusting act was the torching of a house in which a family of some 16 people were hiding. It looks like none survived. Shadows of the church burning in Eldoret, in which Kikuyu residents were taking refuge from Kalenjin gangs and were burnt alive. Other reports, and the Kenyan media are characteristically silent on naming ethnic groups, have Kikuyu gangs attacking 'certain communities' in Nakuru town and along the Naivasha-Nakuru road, to the point of dragging people out of public vehicles and beating them on account of their names.
After being targeted, in Eldoret, Narok, and other parts of the country, some Kikuyu seem to be asserting their claim to the central Rift Valley as a Kikuyu area. They are, in fact, the majority in Nakuru and Naivasha, both of which (not coincidentally) belonged to the Maasai before British colonization, expropriation, and settlement. While this escalation of violence carries with it memories of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, it is a very different, popular form of ecstatic violence. While Kenya's periodic outbreaks of violence generally have ethnicity as a defining feature, they are not usually planned from above, unlike both Rwanda and Yugoslavia. The kind of conflict growing in Kenya can not properly be called ethnic cleansing or genocide (at least as long as this sickeningly familiar pattern, which we have seen over and over in Kenya, continues), it can spiral on into a series of revenge attacks and revenge for revenge attacks. Until Nakuru erupted late last week, the situation had begun to look hopeful; now, I have great doubts about the prospect for peace in the near future, and for the prospect of a major change that will prevent this kind of thing from recurring again in the long-term.
This is a very discouraging and depressing turn of events, and it can be directly attributed to the unwillingness of either side, the ODM or the PNU, to make overt gestures of compromise. While PNU politicians continue to blame ODM for organizing ethnic cleansing and even genocide (which I still maintain is a grossly overstated position), they make no mention of Kibaki and their own refusal to accept or admit what all election observers have been stating: that the presidential results are not credible and that the election was thus flawed. The ODM, for its part, continues to fan the flames by stating its quite legitimate position that it will not allow any group of politicians steal democracy from the Kenyan people. While it seems apparent to me, from my reading of news and other reports, that the ODM has a far more legitimate claim in this battle, they are not blameless. They are, as one colleague here in Montreal pointed out the other day, doing as much as they can if they still want to maintain grassroots support of their followers. If ODM were to capitulate and accept the current 'government' as legitimate, or even sufficient to rule Kenya, they would lose all credibility, and there is no guarantee that their supporters would follow such a proclamation.
The 'government,' on the other hand, bears at least as much of the blame, and potentially more. They were apparently responsible for the initial trigger of this mess, a stolen presidential election. They have spoken out, condemning the violence, which is positive, but have generally done so by blaming ODM for organizing or inciting it. The “government's” unwillingness to even suggest, in public or private, that it may be willing to discuss a compromise, is as much to blame for the ongoing and spreading conflict. It is understandable, in a sense, that they cannot admit their own treachery, especially if they want to retain any sense of legitimacy if, in fact, they do come out of this period as the governing body of Kenya. It is, however, a disgusting display of their willingness to leverage ongoing chaos, the deaths of many Kenyan citizens, and the destruction of property, livelihoods, and before long the entire economy, to pressure their opponents to accept the group's claims to legitimacy.
While Kenya has already become a loser in this staring contest, with a country in tatters, hundreds dead, and a lost faith in the growth of a Kenyan state along democratic lines, if ODM backs down now, and PNU and Kibaki are allowed to maintain the President's post, the country will lose yet again, and all of this violence will have been even more in vain. That a political elite can sit by and allow the country they want to rule to descend into chaos while they engage in a staring contest over who will rule what's left when the violence dies down turns my stomach. That one side is sitting in the halls of power, posing as a government and claiming to represent their nation, and that they might be able to use the blood of their own citizens to make the final victory push in their fraudulent, and now criminal, grab for power, breaks my heart.
To see a country that I have come to love dearly torn apart in this way is incredibly difficult. To sit here from a distance, away from the friends I have made and the families I have become a part of, is an excruciating experience. I have never felt so helpless, so angry, and yet so determined to find a way to make this better.
Wednesday, January 23, 2008
Wangari Maathai, quoted (and cut and pasted) from the Standard http://www.eastandard.net/news/?id=1143980798&cid=4
"But Nobel Peace laureate, Prof Wangari Maathai, regretted that as the current political crisis persisted, President Kibaki continued to remain aloof and unreachable.
"But Nobel Peace laureate, Prof Wangari Maathai, regretted that as the current political crisis persisted, President Kibaki continued to remain aloof and unreachable.
"Internationally, the conflict is presented as ‘ethnic cleansing’ and another "Rwanda’ in the making since Kibaki and Raila are from two communities," she said.
Kenyans, she noted, bury their heads in shame, anger and frustrations as they continue to plead with the President, but State House appeared out of reach.
"Why is it difficult for Kibaki to personally pick a phone, as they sometimes do, and ask Raila to talk? He is unreachable. He is near yet so far," she said.
She called for the beginning of a healing and reconciliation process among Kenyans.
She said the current political impasse would be resolved by understanding the root cause of tribal clashes.
"This time round, let Kenyans not sweep tribal clashes, demonstrations, murders, rapes and destruction of property under the carpet as they have always done. Only when the truth is known and justice is received can anxiety be reduced and wounds heal," she said."
True that.
Friday, January 18, 2008
Protests and riots
January 17, Montreal
News reports come in from the second day of ODM's planned "people peace power" rallies. Yesterday's news was that the rallies were mainly dispersed by tear gas, with live rounds fired in various locations and 4 people killed. BBC has reported that two children were killed in Kisumu, one 13, the other 5 years old. Most likely they were caught in the cross-fire when police and GSU troops opened fire on protesters, which doesn't justify their deaths. BBC has also reported that the police spokesman has claimed officers using live rounds in Kisumu had disobeyed orders. What will become of them, if that is indeed the case?
In Nairobi, GSU troops have blocked reporters from entering Kibera to document the 'operation' launched against ODM supporters. One story from the East African Standard reports that police used tear gas to disperse media personnel who were attempting to follow running battles in the slum.
Yesterday the police filled an Eldoret hospital with tear gas. No reports on why or what exactly prompted that bizarre contravention of normal operating procedure.
In another of Nairobi's slums, Mathare, reports are coming out that fighting is not just between protesters and police, but also between local residents of different ethnic groups. Kikuyu youths, apparently, have attacked Luo there.
In Eldoret, violence and destruction targetting Kikuyu residents continues. BBC showed a picture of at least one house, reportedly belonging to a Kikuyu family, having buckets of water thrown towards its smouldering posts and beams.
The continued, low-intensity (is that the right term?) ethnic conflict in different parts of the country is not encouraging. As much as there is a political crisis in the country which needs to be resolved for long-term democratic stability, there are serious fault lines in "Kenyan" society that must be addressed in the long-term to prevent the cyclical eruptions of ethnic conflict that have plagued Kenya for decades. This can only be done, however, once the current fighting has stopped and some sort of peace restored, preventing an escalation of revenge attacks. Peace first, then truth and reconciliation, so that justice can be done. And it will take far more than simply going after leaders (at whatever level, whether political, criminal, popular, or other) who have inspired, instigated, or organized this kind of conflict. The underlying issues, including various types of inequality, injustice, and non-violent tribalism, need to be sorted out in one way or another.
On the political front, the driver of an ODM MP, from Kasarani constituency in Nairobi, has reportedly been murdered by police, and ODM leaders are reporting that they are being targetted for assasination. I'd like to believe that to be a remote possibility, but given Kenya's history and the current state of chaos, it could conceivably happen. If it does, it will undoubtedly be chalked up to fanatics or gangsters, whose links to politicians can only be inferred, rather than traced. If it does happen, the situation will get much, much worse in the country.
ODM is persisting in its claims that the election was stolen, that the government is illegitimate, and has now added that international sanctions must be applied to both stop the repression of citizens who want to protest in favour of democracy and against the election results, and to bring about a political solution to a political crisis.
Internationally, interested parties continue to voice their displeasure with both the election results and the aftermath. From initial warnings that 'business as usual' could not be the case if some concrete actions are not taken to solve the problems, to more recent intimations that aid money will be withheld unless a) violence stops and b) the elections results are revisited suggest that international 'partners' are losing patience and faith that the 'government' will easily restore order, allowing all involved to ignore the claims that electoral fraud was used to retain Kibaki's position as president.
A lot of people have some explaining to do. Why is it so important that Kibaki retain the presidency? Is it really worth the mounting death toll, the crushing blow to recent economic growth, and the goodwill of the international community?
If Raila and ODM play this well, they'll be able to shift attention back to the political problem, and if they're really interested in the welfare of the Kenyan state (and its citizens) they'll push that even further to fundamental changes which may prevent similar catastrophes from happening in the future. Basically, whether they acheive the main goal of unseating Kibaki and putting Raila in State House is somehow irrelevant, especially if they do so and then commit the same failures they have accused Kibaki of presiding over.
I continue to reserve judgement about what ODM may or may not do if they do in fact have the election results nullified.
News reports come in from the second day of ODM's planned "people peace power" rallies. Yesterday's news was that the rallies were mainly dispersed by tear gas, with live rounds fired in various locations and 4 people killed. BBC has reported that two children were killed in Kisumu, one 13, the other 5 years old. Most likely they were caught in the cross-fire when police and GSU troops opened fire on protesters, which doesn't justify their deaths. BBC has also reported that the police spokesman has claimed officers using live rounds in Kisumu had disobeyed orders. What will become of them, if that is indeed the case?
In Nairobi, GSU troops have blocked reporters from entering Kibera to document the 'operation' launched against ODM supporters. One story from the East African Standard reports that police used tear gas to disperse media personnel who were attempting to follow running battles in the slum.
Yesterday the police filled an Eldoret hospital with tear gas. No reports on why or what exactly prompted that bizarre contravention of normal operating procedure.
In another of Nairobi's slums, Mathare, reports are coming out that fighting is not just between protesters and police, but also between local residents of different ethnic groups. Kikuyu youths, apparently, have attacked Luo there.
In Eldoret, violence and destruction targetting Kikuyu residents continues. BBC showed a picture of at least one house, reportedly belonging to a Kikuyu family, having buckets of water thrown towards its smouldering posts and beams.
The continued, low-intensity (is that the right term?) ethnic conflict in different parts of the country is not encouraging. As much as there is a political crisis in the country which needs to be resolved for long-term democratic stability, there are serious fault lines in "Kenyan" society that must be addressed in the long-term to prevent the cyclical eruptions of ethnic conflict that have plagued Kenya for decades. This can only be done, however, once the current fighting has stopped and some sort of peace restored, preventing an escalation of revenge attacks. Peace first, then truth and reconciliation, so that justice can be done. And it will take far more than simply going after leaders (at whatever level, whether political, criminal, popular, or other) who have inspired, instigated, or organized this kind of conflict. The underlying issues, including various types of inequality, injustice, and non-violent tribalism, need to be sorted out in one way or another.
On the political front, the driver of an ODM MP, from Kasarani constituency in Nairobi, has reportedly been murdered by police, and ODM leaders are reporting that they are being targetted for assasination. I'd like to believe that to be a remote possibility, but given Kenya's history and the current state of chaos, it could conceivably happen. If it does, it will undoubtedly be chalked up to fanatics or gangsters, whose links to politicians can only be inferred, rather than traced. If it does happen, the situation will get much, much worse in the country.
ODM is persisting in its claims that the election was stolen, that the government is illegitimate, and has now added that international sanctions must be applied to both stop the repression of citizens who want to protest in favour of democracy and against the election results, and to bring about a political solution to a political crisis.
Internationally, interested parties continue to voice their displeasure with both the election results and the aftermath. From initial warnings that 'business as usual' could not be the case if some concrete actions are not taken to solve the problems, to more recent intimations that aid money will be withheld unless a) violence stops and b) the elections results are revisited suggest that international 'partners' are losing patience and faith that the 'government' will easily restore order, allowing all involved to ignore the claims that electoral fraud was used to retain Kibaki's position as president.
A lot of people have some explaining to do. Why is it so important that Kibaki retain the presidency? Is it really worth the mounting death toll, the crushing blow to recent economic growth, and the goodwill of the international community?
If Raila and ODM play this well, they'll be able to shift attention back to the political problem, and if they're really interested in the welfare of the Kenyan state (and its citizens) they'll push that even further to fundamental changes which may prevent similar catastrophes from happening in the future. Basically, whether they acheive the main goal of unseating Kibaki and putting Raila in State House is somehow irrelevant, especially if they do so and then commit the same failures they have accused Kibaki of presiding over.
I continue to reserve judgement about what ODM may or may not do if they do in fact have the election results nullified.
Tuesday, January 15, 2008
Mr Speaker
January 15, Kingston
ODM scored a major victory today by electing it's preferred candidate as Speaker of the Kenyan Parliament. Sound exiciting? It actually is (or was).
PNU, over the past few days has voiced its confidence that it would be able to re-elect Francis ole Kaparo, perennial Speaker to his post by bringing together enough MPs to win the vote. The first two rounds of the election require a two-thirds majority, and it was clear that neither side would be able to acheive this, as ODM and its ally, Narc, had a combined total of 110 seats, with the PNU/ODM-K alliance weighing in around 87, and up to 25 wild cards.
The voting went to the third round, where a simple majority is required, and ODM carried the day with Kenneth Marende receiving 105 votes to Kaparo's 101.
While this isn't a major blow to Kibaki - the speaker, after all, has limited power but is third in line to the presidency in the event of an emergency - it does strengthen ODM's position. Of course, ideally a Speaker remains impartial in carrying out his duties; but ODM flexing its collective muscle in parliament to bring in their candidate as Speaker will encourage them to continue pressing the issue of the flawed elections.
BBC reports that Pentagon member William Ruto, in a wonderful example of the kind of debate usually found in Kenya's Parliament, called for an open vote rather than secret ballot for the Speaker's vote. "We went through [national] elections with a secret ballot, and you stole the vote." he argued. This, apparently, sparked some outrage on the government side of the house. ODM was rumoured to be planning to sit on the government side in Parliament, but this didn't come to pass.
No word today yet on whether the swearing-in of MPs and election of the speaker was broadcast live on Kenyan media. The local papers had contradictory reports, one saying the live coverage would go ahead, the other saying it was banned as part of the continuing ban imposed by the government after the elections to prevent 'inciteful' reporting. Also no reports, yet, of any fall-out from the day's politicking.
Rallies planned for tomorrow, Thursday, and Friday country-wide, are still said to be banned by police.
Kofi Annan is reported to have the flu, and is thus delaying his trip to Kenya. This after yesterday's proclamations by John Michuki and George Saitoti, that he would be allowed to enter the country but had not been officially invited to help mediate anything. They said that they had no problem with the election results and thus had no reason to call for a mediator to help negotiate a solution to a problem they don't acknowledge. They're still calling on Raila and ODM to go to court if they dispute the election results, knowing full-well that it will take years in Kenyan court to get anywhere, and that's if the government is not an interested party in your case...
ODM scored a major victory today by electing it's preferred candidate as Speaker of the Kenyan Parliament. Sound exiciting? It actually is (or was).
PNU, over the past few days has voiced its confidence that it would be able to re-elect Francis ole Kaparo, perennial Speaker to his post by bringing together enough MPs to win the vote. The first two rounds of the election require a two-thirds majority, and it was clear that neither side would be able to acheive this, as ODM and its ally, Narc, had a combined total of 110 seats, with the PNU/ODM-K alliance weighing in around 87, and up to 25 wild cards.
The voting went to the third round, where a simple majority is required, and ODM carried the day with Kenneth Marende receiving 105 votes to Kaparo's 101.
While this isn't a major blow to Kibaki - the speaker, after all, has limited power but is third in line to the presidency in the event of an emergency - it does strengthen ODM's position. Of course, ideally a Speaker remains impartial in carrying out his duties; but ODM flexing its collective muscle in parliament to bring in their candidate as Speaker will encourage them to continue pressing the issue of the flawed elections.
BBC reports that Pentagon member William Ruto, in a wonderful example of the kind of debate usually found in Kenya's Parliament, called for an open vote rather than secret ballot for the Speaker's vote. "We went through [national] elections with a secret ballot, and you stole the vote." he argued. This, apparently, sparked some outrage on the government side of the house. ODM was rumoured to be planning to sit on the government side in Parliament, but this didn't come to pass.
No word today yet on whether the swearing-in of MPs and election of the speaker was broadcast live on Kenyan media. The local papers had contradictory reports, one saying the live coverage would go ahead, the other saying it was banned as part of the continuing ban imposed by the government after the elections to prevent 'inciteful' reporting. Also no reports, yet, of any fall-out from the day's politicking.
Rallies planned for tomorrow, Thursday, and Friday country-wide, are still said to be banned by police.
Kofi Annan is reported to have the flu, and is thus delaying his trip to Kenya. This after yesterday's proclamations by John Michuki and George Saitoti, that he would be allowed to enter the country but had not been officially invited to help mediate anything. They said that they had no problem with the election results and thus had no reason to call for a mediator to help negotiate a solution to a problem they don't acknowledge. They're still calling on Raila and ODM to go to court if they dispute the election results, knowing full-well that it will take years in Kenyan court to get anywhere, and that's if the government is not an interested party in your case...
Wednesday, January 9, 2008
In the cabinet
Alfred Mutua was right. Kibaki announced a mini-cabinet, filling most of the key ministries, just yesterday while I was somewhere in the air. I'd love to know what Kenyans think about it. My predictions are that a lot will have confirmed their belief that Kalonzo was going to jump in with Kibaki all along. My main complaint about that is, if he was going to 'defect' from the opposition Orange movements, he should have done it before the election, taking his turn to declare "Kibaki Tosha." In fact, given this turn of events, one could argue that Kalonzo might have helped to avoid the chaos that erupted post election, by contributing his presidential votes to Kibaki's effort, giving Kibaki enough support for a legitimate win. Whether that would have prevented rigging, just for additional certainty, is another question, and whether ODM would have still cried foul in the same way, is yet another.
The new cabinet, as reported by the Daily Nation
Without saying too much, given that most of what I know about it is rumour and/or heresay, Saitoti's appointment does not bode particularly well for certain friends of mine involved in Kenyan civil society. They had joked before the election that if both he and Kibaki return, they'll have to seek alternative citizenship. The fact that their jokes were only 50% intended humour and 50% fearing for their safety makes me worry for them.
The new cabinet, as reported by the Daily Nation
"Following is the full list of Cabinet appointments:
- Vice President and Minister for Home Affairs Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka;
- Minister of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, Prof George Saitoti;
- Minister of State for Defence Yusuf Mohamed Haji;
- Minister of State for Special Programmes Dr Naomi Namsi Shabaan;
- Minister for Public Service Asman Abongotum Kamama;
- Minister for Finance Amos Muhinga Kimunya;
- Minister for Education Prof Sam Ongeri;
- Minister for Foreign Affairs; Moses Wetang’ula;
- Minister for Local Government Uhuru Kenyatta;
- Minister for Information and Communications Mr Samuel Lesuron Poghisio;
- Minister for Water and Irrigation John Munyes;
- Minister for Energy Mr Kiraitu Murungi;
- Minister for Roads and Public Works John Njoroge Michuki;
- Minister for Science and Technology; Noah M. Wekesa;
- Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs Ms Martha Karua;
- Minister for East African Community Dr Wilfred Machage;
- Minister for Transport Chirau Ali Mwakwere."
Without saying too much, given that most of what I know about it is rumour and/or heresay, Saitoti's appointment does not bode particularly well for certain friends of mine involved in Kenyan civil society. They had joked before the election that if both he and Kibaki return, they'll have to seek alternative citizenship. The fact that their jokes were only 50% intended humour and 50% fearing for their safety makes me worry for them.
Tuesday, January 8, 2008
Detached
January 8, 2008
Schiphol, Amsterdam
I'm on my way to Canada for a pre-planned break from 'the field.' When the election madness started getting really crazy in Kenya, I seriously considered changing or canceling my flight to stick around and keep an eye on things. Given the way things have gone in the past week, I decided to go ahead with the trip, in hopes that I can follow whatever political developments emerge through Kenyan newspapers online and text messages with friends in the country and involved to various degrees in the process. We'll see how that goes. I'm already feeling rather detached.
By mid-day yesterday, the planned ODM rallies across the country and in Nairobi had apparently been called off. It seems that attempts to turn the political standoff into a popular revolution by using peaceful mass demonstrations have been frustrated. While they've been showing commendable restraint in dispersing the rallies that have been attempted (tear gas and water cannons qualify as restraint when it comes to Kenyan protests, whether political or not), the police and military have clearly not joined hands with ODM in protesting the outcome of the General Election. The rumours that circulated in the last days of 2007 and first few of 2008, that the police commissioner and high ranking military officials had or were about to step down in protest have been shown to be mere rumours. Security officials continue to cite peace and order as the reason for not issuing permits or allowing mass gatherings by ODM. Many Kenyans, however, perceive this as clear support for the PNU government and president Kibaki. What this means for dealing with the complaints of fraud and non-democracy, is still unclear.
The ODM Pentagon members and key players were, as far I had been made aware just before I got to the airport, planning a lunch time session just outside Nairobi to strategize the way forward. It's still too early for news to be released, though (Kenyan) tomorrow's newspapers should have something by late afternoon Eastern Canadian time. Already my disconnection from direct information and my burning curiousity are causing me problems.
The online papers say diplomacy is moving forward. There's an invitation for a meeting on Friday. Kibaki wants to convene parliament on the 15th (which could spell his doom, depending on the crafty politics). Etc, etc, etc.
Monday, January 7, 2008
Stalemate.
January 7, Karen.
The chaos and 'unrest' that have transported Kenya into a surreal alternate world over the past week seem to be cooling down. Killings and shootings continue, seemingly mostly by police trying to disperse 'looters' or 'rioters', etc. The roads are opening up, although assembly points for caravans to get police escorts have been established in several towns. Well over 100,000 people are still camping out in places like Jamhuri Grounds, Nairobi, and police posts around the country, not only for fear of attack but also for the fact that they have nothing to go back to where they had their homes. Whole neighbourhoods have been razed, ash and smoking timber left in their place.
Domestic relief efforts continue. From collection of food and clothing at various supermarkets in Nairobi and other major towns to the production of songs of peace, complete with music videos, by teams of local artists. Yesterday was a mass prayer day, with churches around the country dedicating their services to restoring peace through prayer.
On the political end, things haven't changed much. Various envoys from various foreign powers (including Desmond Tutu and the US's 'top envoy' - Jenayi Frazer? - ) have met with both Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki.
So far, 'negotiations' or discussions, or whatever they are, continue in the style of a dysfunctional family's dinner table. Word is leaked from Kibaki's group that he would consider a coalition government. Raila rejects the idea in a press conference, saying that he is the rightfully elected President and should be the one to extend offers of coalition in his government.
Government spokesman (and TV screenwriter/producer/director), Alfred Mutua responds that "The President will announce a government of national unity when he is ready, and whether Mr Odinga and his party will be involved is another question." That is, 'well, we didn't mean a coalition with you!'
Kenyans, or at least many of the ones I hang out with, have returned to talking politics rather than being shocked at the rioting and destruction that occured. People have plenty of ideas for how to proceed. Some regret that ODM didn't prepare for this eventuality, saying that they should have made sure that at least some of the military and an appropriately senior judge were on their side, to swear in Raila and then pressure Kibaki into stepping aside. To me, this seems like Russian roullette. It might have worked, or it might have led to civil war.
Others are already performing the calculations of parliamentary seats. ODM and allies have gotten 102, and will then nominate 6 more, giving them 108. PNU, earlier announced to have 37, apparently now has 46. I'm not sure where those 9 others came from. If PNU, all their pre-election allies, ODM-K (Kalonzo's party), and the 11 MPs from 'unaligned parties' all join together, they'll just have enough to outvote ODM (111, I think is the total, with three vacan seats because the counting was called off when irregularities got too bad). This seems unlikely, although not impossible.
Others have suggested that Kibaki will perform the usual feats of Kenyan politics, that is, poaching MPs from other parties, including ODM. Many of the candidates have spent all they had to get their seats, and may be more than willing to consider a ministerial appointment, with its extra salary, for jumping off the ODM ship and joining Kibaki. Parties in Kenya, afterall, do tend to be little more than election vehicles for candidates who seem to choose their party by divining which one has the best chance of getting them the seat and the inflated salary that goes with it.
Kibaki's men (and women) continue to assert that he has been legally declared president, following the official announcement of results by the ECK and the inauguration ceremony presided over by the Chief Justice. Funny, at the inauguration, that they didn't even both with the national anthem, nor did they apparently invite anyone but PNU winners and losers to attend. This has sparked some rumours that the inauguration was filmed in the morning, leading ECK Chairman Kivuitu no option but to press ahead with the announcement of the results. Like a Kenyan moon-landing conspiracy theory.
ODM, for its part, continues to call for public rallies. Now set for Tuesday, they want demonstations in all major towns and several sites throughout Nairobi. Perhaps this is an effort to draw security officers away from the main Nairobi target, Uhuru Park, in order to weaken the lines to a point where the marchers can safely get in. The police and military continue to disperse rallies with water cannons and tear gas. Mombasa has had two such rallies broken up over the weekend.
The police insist that political rallies are banned for security reasons. Police spokesperson, Eric Kiraithe has claimed that they have 'evidence' that undesirables are planning to use the ODM rallies as covers for looting missions and violence, which is enough reason for them to outlaw the rallies altogether in the interest of public safety. Of course, there's nothing political in the opposition's rallies being banned.
The Nairobi Star (junk food for your brain) had a blurb on Friday in which the MP-elect for Kieni constituency called for a protest against the EU observers. They're lying, he says, when they claim that the presidential tally in his constituency was changed from 50-somthing thousand to 70-something thousand for Kibaki. Not sure whether his rally went on or was broken up by the police.
It seems virtually consensus, with everyone but Kibaki and his closest supporters, that the election was flawed and something needs to be done about it. Whether that will happen in the near future or not is another question. As long as uncertainty prevails, there is high potential for more rioting, looting, and violence when steps start to be taken, unless both political sides somehow come together.
The chaos and 'unrest' that have transported Kenya into a surreal alternate world over the past week seem to be cooling down. Killings and shootings continue, seemingly mostly by police trying to disperse 'looters' or 'rioters', etc. The roads are opening up, although assembly points for caravans to get police escorts have been established in several towns. Well over 100,000 people are still camping out in places like Jamhuri Grounds, Nairobi, and police posts around the country, not only for fear of attack but also for the fact that they have nothing to go back to where they had their homes. Whole neighbourhoods have been razed, ash and smoking timber left in their place.
Domestic relief efforts continue. From collection of food and clothing at various supermarkets in Nairobi and other major towns to the production of songs of peace, complete with music videos, by teams of local artists. Yesterday was a mass prayer day, with churches around the country dedicating their services to restoring peace through prayer.
On the political end, things haven't changed much. Various envoys from various foreign powers (including Desmond Tutu and the US's 'top envoy' - Jenayi Frazer? - ) have met with both Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki.
So far, 'negotiations' or discussions, or whatever they are, continue in the style of a dysfunctional family's dinner table. Word is leaked from Kibaki's group that he would consider a coalition government. Raila rejects the idea in a press conference, saying that he is the rightfully elected President and should be the one to extend offers of coalition in his government.
Government spokesman (and TV screenwriter/producer/director), Alfred Mutua responds that "The President will announce a government of national unity when he is ready, and whether Mr Odinga and his party will be involved is another question." That is, 'well, we didn't mean a coalition with you!'
Kenyans, or at least many of the ones I hang out with, have returned to talking politics rather than being shocked at the rioting and destruction that occured. People have plenty of ideas for how to proceed. Some regret that ODM didn't prepare for this eventuality, saying that they should have made sure that at least some of the military and an appropriately senior judge were on their side, to swear in Raila and then pressure Kibaki into stepping aside. To me, this seems like Russian roullette. It might have worked, or it might have led to civil war.
Others are already performing the calculations of parliamentary seats. ODM and allies have gotten 102, and will then nominate 6 more, giving them 108. PNU, earlier announced to have 37, apparently now has 46. I'm not sure where those 9 others came from. If PNU, all their pre-election allies, ODM-K (Kalonzo's party), and the 11 MPs from 'unaligned parties' all join together, they'll just have enough to outvote ODM (111, I think is the total, with three vacan seats because the counting was called off when irregularities got too bad). This seems unlikely, although not impossible.
Others have suggested that Kibaki will perform the usual feats of Kenyan politics, that is, poaching MPs from other parties, including ODM. Many of the candidates have spent all they had to get their seats, and may be more than willing to consider a ministerial appointment, with its extra salary, for jumping off the ODM ship and joining Kibaki. Parties in Kenya, afterall, do tend to be little more than election vehicles for candidates who seem to choose their party by divining which one has the best chance of getting them the seat and the inflated salary that goes with it.
Kibaki's men (and women) continue to assert that he has been legally declared president, following the official announcement of results by the ECK and the inauguration ceremony presided over by the Chief Justice. Funny, at the inauguration, that they didn't even both with the national anthem, nor did they apparently invite anyone but PNU winners and losers to attend. This has sparked some rumours that the inauguration was filmed in the morning, leading ECK Chairman Kivuitu no option but to press ahead with the announcement of the results. Like a Kenyan moon-landing conspiracy theory.
ODM, for its part, continues to call for public rallies. Now set for Tuesday, they want demonstations in all major towns and several sites throughout Nairobi. Perhaps this is an effort to draw security officers away from the main Nairobi target, Uhuru Park, in order to weaken the lines to a point where the marchers can safely get in. The police and military continue to disperse rallies with water cannons and tear gas. Mombasa has had two such rallies broken up over the weekend.
The police insist that political rallies are banned for security reasons. Police spokesperson, Eric Kiraithe has claimed that they have 'evidence' that undesirables are planning to use the ODM rallies as covers for looting missions and violence, which is enough reason for them to outlaw the rallies altogether in the interest of public safety. Of course, there's nothing political in the opposition's rallies being banned.
The Nairobi Star (junk food for your brain) had a blurb on Friday in which the MP-elect for Kieni constituency called for a protest against the EU observers. They're lying, he says, when they claim that the presidential tally in his constituency was changed from 50-somthing thousand to 70-something thousand for Kibaki. Not sure whether his rally went on or was broken up by the police.
It seems virtually consensus, with everyone but Kibaki and his closest supporters, that the election was flawed and something needs to be done about it. Whether that will happen in the near future or not is another question. As long as uncertainty prevails, there is high potential for more rioting, looting, and violence when steps start to be taken, unless both political sides somehow come together.
Ethnic politics, ethnic violence
Kiserian, January 7, 2008
International media outlets produce large-type headlines: “Kenya could become another Rwanda” “Fears of ethnic violence grow” “Kenya sparks tribalism debate”
The clashes and rioting instigated by the outcome of the December 27, 2007, General Election have, in some cases, taken on an ethnic dimension. Leaders from both PNU and ODM camps have accused their opponents of directing ethnic cleansing. Rwanda, an obvious African example, is invoked. Yugoslavia, the counterpart of the politico-ethnic conflicts of 1990s Kenya, is not mentioned. Neither is a particularly good metaphor for the current situation in Kenya, but both are prominent in Western minds as repugnant outbreaks of senseless killing. Fear-mongering that Kenya could quickly turn into a wholesale genocidal slaughter may prompt swift reactions from an international community that has repeatedly vowed “Never Again.”
So far, the most obvious and disgusting case has been the torching of a Kenya Assemblies of God church in Eldoret. Inside, Kikuyu residents of the area, many of them children, sought refuge from violence targeted at them, simply on account of the fact that they share tribal identity with Mwai Kibaki, the controversially inaugurated, second-term President of the Republic. Many of them die. Burned alive. The Red Cross removed 17 bodies. Some reports say 30 dead, others 50, others as many as 100.
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Wangari Maathai, herself a Kikuyu, is shown on television reading a prepared statement urging President Kibaki to speak out and make the first steps to resolve the conflict. People from her community, the Kikuyu, are being targeted because of their ethnicity based on the assumption that they are PNU and Kibaki supporters. This should not happen. In other places, attacks on Luo and people from other ethnic groups are being perpetrated on the assumption that they support ODM. This should not happen. Some of these fights are not about politics, or the election, but rather the current turn of events has allowed stress and frustration to be expressed in the form of burning houses and businesses and bleeding bodies.
People consistently express their shock that ethnic violence could erupt in Kenya, a peaceful and stable country. People insist that for years “we have all lived side-by-side, in peace, as neighbours and friends.” Thus, it is unimaginable that neighbours and friends, on the simple basis of their heritage, could begin to fight and kill one another. But it happens frequently.
In the early 1990s, linked to the reintroduction of multi-party politics through internal and external pressure, a series of violent clashes appeared along ethnic fault lines, especially in areas where 'outsiders' had been seen to 'immigrate' or 'encroach' into traditional territories of smaller groups. Around 1,500 died in a few years of sporadic outbreaks. Up to 500,000 more were displaced from their homes. Satisfactory resettlement has not yet occurred, 16 years later.
In the western part of Narok District, seemingly regular fights have broken out where Kipsigis are seen to be moving in to Maasai territory, competing for land and other resources. A friend who lives near Ololulung'a, the headquarters of the newly created Narok South District once told me that it happens about every three or four years. Someone starts a fight and young men from both sides are ferried into the area in pickup trucks, with pangas, clubs, and stones. Houses are burned, people displaced. And then the fighting stops and people go back to living beside or between one another.
On the eastern side of Narok District, it's not the Kipsigis but the Kikuyu who are seen to be encroaching. This has been a persistent political issue for at least 80 years. Maasai would be involved in several types of relationship with Kikuyu, either for the crops they produced, the fact that their daughters were available for marriage, or for their political support within the closed district. Other Maasai, no doubt with their own Kikuyu relatives, associates, and workers, would complain and raise calls for the eviction of Kikuyu from the district. They were ruining the environment, degrading Maasai culture, or trying to stand up on their own politically and economically, or so the complaints usually conveyed. A major fit of violence occurred along the north-eastern Narok boundary in 1993; as many as 30,000 Kikuyu fled across into what was then part of Nakuru District, and many of them are still there
In 2005, tensions between Maasai and Kikuyu broke wide open for a few days in Maai Mahiu and Suswa, further south along the Maasai-Kikuyu boundary and into Narok District. The trigger: a Kikuyu councilor had installed larger than agreed upon water pipes for an irrigation scheme on his land, diverting water away from the lowlands where Maasai pastoralists depend on it so their herds can drink. Both sides killed. Both sides lost people. In one of the most gruesome incidents, matatus were stopped in Maai Mahiu and passengers' ID cards inspected. If your name was obviously Maasai, you were killed. Similarly, in places like Ewuaso Nkidong'i and Empaash, Maasai chased and killed Kikuyu residents. Then the government, perceived by many as controlled by the Kikuyu tribe, and especially Internal Security Minister John Michuki, ordered troops deployed to quell the violence. A helicopter was sent up and a group of Maasai men mowed down from the air. There's no clear evidence they were involved in the fighting. Kikuyu shopkeepers and business people, and their families, packed their belongings and fled towns along the Narok road in fear for their lives. The fighting stopped after a few days, and eventually life went back to normal.
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Normal life in Kenya includes the issue of ethnicity. The country is diverse, with “more than 42” being the officially stated number of tribal groups, which includes at least two agglomerations of smaller, relatively independent units. Of those “more than 42” only five have more than ten percent of the total Kenyan population. The Kikuyu comprise more than twenty percent of all Kenyans. The Luo nearly fourteen. The Luhya, a group of some sixteen sub-tribes, makes up just fewer than the Luo. The Kamba, just more than ten. And the Kalenjin, which includes Nandi, Kispsigis, Tugen, Pokot, and others, just fewer than the Kamba. Each of these is the dominant group in one of Kenya's provinces. Kikuyu in Central, Luo in Nyanza, Luhya in Western, Kalenjin in Rift Valley, and Kamba in Eastern. Three of these five had presidential candidates in the 2007 election: Kikuyu – Kibaki, Luo – Odinga, Kamba -Musyoka. ODM, further, has a “Pentagon” of five main players from the Kalenjin, Luhya, Coastal, and Embu (closely related to the Kikuyu), along with others representing the Maasai, Kamba, and other ethnic groups. The Maasai, one of Africa's best-known tribal groups, comprises less than 1.5% of Kenya's population, and even when combined with their close cousins, the Samburu, does not surpass 2%.
The fact that there are ethnic groups is not, in itself, the cause of conflict in Kenya. The composition of the population, however, may be a contributing factor. David Horowitz, in his well-known book Ethnic Groups in Conflict, has argued that a population composed of a small number of large ethnic groups is a dangerous political situation as they are able to compete for control of state resources and power. A large number of small ethnic groups, on the other hand, is supposed to lead to a political situation in which no single group or coalition of groups can easily seize and keep hold of power. Kenya's political history is a strong piece of evidence for this theory.
No single community in Kenya can democratically capture the reigns of state power by itself, due to the combined demographic and democratic composition of the country. The constitution requires that to become president, a candidate must secure at least 25% of the popular vote in five of the eight provinces of the country, in addition to gaining the highest number of votes. Without support from members of different communities, no single leader can achieve this by relying on the votes of his own people.
Mwai Kibaki, then a candidate of the National Rainbow Coalition, was first elected president in December, 2002. Kibaki had been an important opposition leader since the reintroduction of multi-parties. He was effectively given the seat when Raila Odinga, another potential candidate declared “Kibaki Tosha” (Kibaki is enough) and stepped out of the internal Narc race. There had apparently been a Memorandum of Understanding crafted behind the scenes to unite leaders of different communities and defeat the Kenya African National Union, which had ruled the country since Independence in 1963. KANU's president, Daniel Moi, a Kalenjin, had agreed to step aside at the end of two constitutionally-amended terms of five years each. He chose Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu and son of the country's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, as his successor. Most people assumed that his choice had been part of an effort to protect himself from investigation over corruption allegations. Moi, it is sometimes said, was Africa's second richest man, behind only Mobutu of Zaire.
The Narc coalition came into power on a platform of anti-corruption and democratic change. People were tired of KANU and it's dirty politics and money-eating. While it was definitely present in the negotiations and campaiging, tribe seemed less an issue than more familiar to Western minds political issues such as good governance, economic growth, job creation, and nation-building.
Within months of the 2002 election, tribe had become important again. The MoU and Kibaki's promises broken, allegations abounded that he was stacking ministries and the civil service with Kikuyu, rather than appointing members of other communities. The defensive claim was that he was choosing the best qualified people. The counter was that there are educated, qualified people from every community, or at least the big ones, and that there was no good reason for such a high number of appointments to be going to the president's backyard.
Fears of Kikuyu dominance began to surface in many parts of the country. Once they got in, it was said, they had no intention of ever losing power again. The constitutional changes promised in the campaign were left by the wayside, and a bastardized version of the document produced through wide consultation with citizens and civil society put forward for referendum in 2005. Rather than reducing the powers of the president and creating a prime-minister's post, the status quo remained largely intact.
Tribe became an issue in the 2007 election as well. Some people say that the Narc coalition broke down into a number of tribal leaders all seeking the highest seat. While this appears to be the case superficially, with Kibaki, Raila, and Kalonzo each seeking the seat, the matter is more complex. Most of the allegations of tribalism came from Kibaki's PNU camp, with claims that ODM was not an election vehicle but an anti-Kikuyu machine. The counter claim was that Kikuyu will only raise concerns of tribalism when they are the victim. Both ODM and PNU carefully proclaimed that they would ensure benefits for 'all Kenyans.' Kibaki's billboards say “amani na maendeleo ya Wakenya Wote” (peace and development for all Kenyans); ODM t-shirts announced 'real change for all Kenyans.' Accusations of tribalism are a handy tool in a country that openly claims to hate the idea, yet continues to practice it.
ODM tried hard to campaign on issues. Corruption, governance reform, devolution of power. PNU countered by turning devolution into 'majimboism' a replay of the cries for ethnic federalism promoted by Kanu leaders in the early 1990s as a way to prevent Kikuyu hegemony. If ODM wins the election, it was claimed, Kikuyu across the country will be forcible returned to Central Province, their ancestral homeland. This despite the fact that many have been born in places like Narok, Kisumu, Mombasa, and elsewhere. ODM should have done more to counter this propaganda piece, especially considering that a significant number of their constituents would not disagree with the prospect and don't see any possibility of connection between freedom of movement and devolution of governance.
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Ethnicity in Kenya is a quiet issue. It is a constant undertone in political discourse. When fighting does break out between communities, leaders are always accused of fanning the flames of hatred. Curiously, when fighting started this year in Kuresoi Division, Molo District, it was regularly reported as 'ethnic violence' and connected to politics, but rarely, if ever, were the names of the communities involved mentioned. Given the history of the place, and the composition of the communities, it's almost certain that the fighting was between Kalenjin and Kikuyu.
Tribalism in Kenya could be divided into two main types. On one hand are preferential appointments and political dealings, along with the direction of the benefits of political position to one's own community. The other is a kind of simmering mistrust between ethnic groups. The two are connected in certain ways.
Political tribalism is in the upper levels of income and power in the country. Corruption goes on, contracts are awarded, funding diverted. Locally, community members and relatives benefit from this type of patronage, but by no means do all members of any one tribe benefit from these practices. In fact, blaming tribalism, and promoting the local level mistrust is a way of blinding people to the fact that Kenya is also riven by class divisions; the political and economic elite are inextricably linked, and the vast majority of Kenyans are not even remotely connected to their networks. For members of many communities, this is easily explained: the elite are Kikuyu and the rest are not. But this obscures the fact that leaders of all communities follow similar practices. During Moi's era, it was Kalenjin who benefited most, and the disconnection of Kikuyu from patronage networks was one of the driving factors behind the push for multi-party democracy. Maasai leaders are no exception to this. Fat bellies, large tracts of land, and successful businesses acquired and run under shady circumstances are a testament to this.
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Within the Maasai community, the other type of tribalism, the one most seated in local communities and informal discussions and drawn upon by political elites in times of need, is barely, or even rarely, hidden below the surface. Further, it is most often directed against the Kikuyu.
A drunken friend in Kiserian one day went on a rant. Kikuyu are rotten, dirty criminals, he told me. Just the other day, they had robbed him of his mobile phone and left him on the side of the road.
Another friend had his phone stolen while on a matatu riding to Kasarani area to the north of the city, on Thika road. Kikuyu, he said. Who else could it be?
When I drive through Dagoretti, Kikuyu town, Limuru, and Maai Mahiu on my way from Kiserian to Enoosupukia, I'm told by Maasai friends never to pick up strangers and to be especially careful, because the Kikuyu will rob me and kill me. If the car breaks down, I should call a mechanic from somewhere else to come help me, because the Kikuyu will cheat me, and then others will come to rob and kill me.
They're all crooks, I'm told. Not a single one who has an honest job or is safe to be around. They want your valuables. It easily progresses from muggings and robbery to buying up Maasai land through crooked deals.
When watching KBC news, or program credits, where names are shown, one friend of mine likes to point out that they're all Kikuyu, who can't even be bothered to give anyone else a job.
I assume that similar things occur in other communities, each with their own 'enemies,' but I haven't experienced it personally. It would be extremely surprising to find any ethnic group in the country without a significant number of members who subscribe to this kind of thinking.
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Maasai have a long history with Kikuyu. Sometimes they are called 'our in-laws', other times they are called 'our enemies.' Having neighboured one another for many decades, as Maasai controlled the Rift Valley and Kikuyu centred on the western slopes of Mt Kenya, they had many types of interaction. Trading of their livelihood products, marriage, especially of Kikuyu women and Maasai men, except in dire circumstances of severe drought or other problems. The Kikuyu, at one point, developed an age-set military system – generational standing armies – possibly modeled on that of the Maasai and other pastoralist peoples. If that theory is true, it was partly due to peaceful interaction and partly due to consistent raiding and conflict between the communities.
When the British came to colonize East Africa, the Maasai were eventually secluded into their reserves, while Kikuyu took advantage of education, opportunities to join the administration, and take on wage labour. Maasai, partly due to their leaders' conservatism, and partly due to British desire to contain, transform, or rid the world of them, for the most part did not engage in the same ways.
While Kikuyu were spreading out through the colony, especially on settler farms in the so-called White Highlands, Maasai mainly stayed on the reserve, practicing pastoralism and their culture. Of course there are exceptions to this. One of those is the emergence of an educated Maasai elite who were required by the government to attend school. Many of those have become political leaders, and some have been parliamentarians. Another exception is the agro-pastoral community in part of Narok District, which many Maasai claim is a livelihood change caused by the true ethnic identity of the people invovled: they must be Kikuyu, or at least 'half-caste.'
Just before independence, a contingent of Maasai walked out of the constitutional negotiations on the grounds that they required to have their lands, nearly half of their former empire, repatriated when the British left. This was not guaranteed by either the British or other Kenyan negotiators. Much of that land was slated for settlement of landless Kikuyu, whose population had grown beyond the capacity of Central Province, a key factor in the growth of the Land and Freedom Army, otherwise known as the Mau Mau.
Many of the White Highlands farms, which some Maasai wanted back from the British, were heavily populated with Kikuyu workers and their families. Some formed land-buying societies to purchase portions of the farms on which they worked from the white owners. Others were resettled by the Kenyatta government, with massive financial assistance from the British government. The Maasai, it seems, gained nothing in terms of land from independence, and now, rather than white colonizers, they saw Kikuyu occupying their ancestral lands and controlling the organs of government.
When questioned as to why freedom of movement is not inherently positive in Kenya, many Maasai will point out that while Kikuyu, and to a lesser extent Somali, are to be found everywhere throughout Maasailand, while you will never find a single Maasai living or working in Nyeri, Kiambu, or other parts of Central (I did, however, hear a Luo business owner call in to the radio from Nyeri the other day to say that no one has even thought to threaten him to move back to Kisumu). Freedom of movement, they argue, benefits only those who were protected by the government to move. In the first 16 years of independence, that was the Kikuyu, and by the time Moi came into power, they had established themselves throughout the republic. Now with Kibaki in place, there was no hope of getting rid of them or gaining back any of the land the Maasai had already lost. Similar complaints are raised in other parts of the Rift Valley, where Kikuyu are seen to have occupied lands once appropriated by the British from other tribes. The process continues with 'outsiders' buying land from locals who either have no options but to sell or are too easily convinced to make fast cash from land sales.
Land and ethnicity have been a useful tool for members of the political elite to stir up support. By promising to deal with those problems that continue to hinder development, Maasai leaders, not all, but a good number of them, gain great popularity. Similar strategies are employed by leaders from other communities. It seems that political tribalism in some way fuels popular tribalism, partly because political tribalism only increases poverty and hardship, partly because leaders of any given group point the finger of blame at leaders of other groups to explain to 'their people' why they must still struggle with poor or dilapidated infrastructure, shortages of teachers, medical care, and government services.
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With ethnicity used as a cover for class divisions, and Kenya disgraced with the honour of having one of the largest gaps between rich and poor, it seems a recipe for mass conflict and destruction, of the sort seen in Rwanda or Yugoslavia. It has yet to turn out that way.
While Yugoslavia's ethnic cleansing was part of an all-out civil war pitting factions of the military against one another, Rwanda's state-sponsored, organized, and executed genocide largely employed the average citizen. Kenyan ethnic clashes tend towards the Rwanda model, but they lack crucial elements of large-scale organization and planning, which, in a post-Rwanda era are highly unlikely to develop. Further, the Rwanda situation, where the elite of two ethnic groups of drastically different size competed for control of state power, has not yet been the case in Kenya.
While individual leaders, whether politically connected, such as Members of Parliament or local councilors, or simply local opinion leaders, including criminals and thugs (such as those involved with the Mungiki Sect – originally a 'traditionalist' Kikuyu gang, now verging on the status of organized crime), may in fact inspire, incite, or even arm hooligans to undertake ethnically targeted acts of violence, Kenya has yet to see anything even close to Rwanda's nearly institutionalized hatred and genocide. In fact, a major difference between recognized cases of genocide and the kind of 'tribal' skirmishes commonly seen in Kenya is the level of organization. If, as in Rwanda, a single ethnic group were in near total control of the government, and they used state and popular media to promote messages of hatred against other groups, and they instituted structures down to the neighbourhood level for monitoring the activities of 'politically incorrect' tribe members, there would be serious cause for concern.
Likewise, if the Kenyan state began to fragment into regions, and ethno-regional leaders fostered strong connections with the military, such that the military could easily be divided and convinced to fight against itself, there would be definite potential for Yugoslavia style 'ethnic cleansing', a term commonly employed in Kenya when fights flare up and call into question the socio-spatial distribution of Kenya's citizenry.
The type of ethnic conflict usually experienced in Kenya, local, low intensity, periodic outbreaks will not easily develop into large scale 'ethnic cleansing' or 'genocide.' That would require complicity or even planning by ethnic elites, participation of the military and security forces, and total ignorance by both internal and international observers. However, Kenya's brands of tribalism, and the periodic violence associated with it, will not easily disappear; even more difficult is the prospect of removing the growing class divisions which ethnicity is frequently used to hide.
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One of the complaints about political tribalism in Kenya is that the ruling ethnic group directs benefits back to their people, often in the form of development projects. Marginalized groups, and some are indeed more marginalized than others, often argue that the reason they have been left out, roads and other infrastructure neglected, hospitals built far away in some other group's 'home,' is that they do not have a representative, or a team of leaders, close to the reigns of power. This is not completely false, nor is it completely true. Ethnicity is only one factor in the uneven development of Kenya, geography, livelihood, and lack of sufficient resources to fully implement plans, along with corruption at all levels and by all manner of leaders and officials, are other contributors to the problem. Likewise, even if 'development' is seen to be given out preferentially, the fact remains that poverty and hardship crosses ethnic and geographic boundaries.
There are poor people in every community. Most of Kenya's rural population could be considered 'poor,' and indeed a percentage are considered to live in absolute poverty. Whether pastoralists, small-scale farmers, or 'former' hunter-gatherers, many people have been left out of the past five years of economic growth in Kenya. Some of the Kibaki government's achievements have been to revitalize parastatals, such as Kenya Cooperative Creameries and the Kenya Meat Commission, which will eventually bring great benefit to rural producers as the institutions grow and increase exports. Roads and electricity have been under repair and construction, slowly, very slowly, but surely. People don't dispute this record, but they do claim that infrastructure projects and the work of such parastatals is primarly targeted at certain areas, inhabited by certain communities, linked to certain major political figures. Whether this is intentional, political tribalism, or a combination of the slow pace of everything and a lack of sufficient funding to do it all at once in Kenya, is debatable, at least with most people.
In Nairobi's slums, among the biggest on the continent, there are representatives of many different ethnic groups. In Kibera, Mathare, Dandora, Huruma, there are Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya, and others. They are all struggling to make a living and to live a comfortable life, regardless of which politicians they support and which leaders are closer to the seat of power. Rural and urban, there is poverty here. Rural and urban, there are those who have become wealthy, sometimes to almost obscene levels, regardless of tribe.
Despite the differences in wealth within any given community, it is rare to hear people accuse members of their own community of appropriating common resources or misdirecting development resources away from the community and into their own pockets. More likely, from what I've seen and heard, is that 'others' are blamed. When they do recognize the growing class differences within their own communities, at least where Maasai are concerned, the member of the elite is often identified as 'really' a member of another tribe. At the same time, there is some sense that leaders have the right to take advantage of their position and enrich themselves. Rarely is the connection made that their self-enrichment might leave the rest of the community struggling to get ahead. Lands are grabbed, money captured, appointments handed out to friends and family. The children of the rich live in Nairobi, go to boarding schools, and are sometimes sent abroad for post-secondary education.
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Friday morning, while driving into town, I was listening to KISS 100, the most popular station among Kenyan youth, or at least those in and around Nairobi. The presenter was complaining that the riots and clashes are being portrayed in international media as tribal. True, she said, some people in some parts of the country had fought just because of tribal background, but Kenya is “not tribalistic! Kiukyu marry Luo, others marry different tribes, etc, etc” she said, her voice emphatic, totally rejecting the notion that ethnicity was an important factor in Kenyan social life.
This is not surprising. The key demographic for the station, and most likely the presenter herself, are part of a class of Kenyans sometimes referred to as the “Kenya tribe.” Not usually a self-ascription, they're most likely to consider themselves Kenyans, in the same way that citizens of many other nations choose nationality as their main identifier. A peculiar German I met in Nairobi once told me that this Kenya tribe was a horrible entity, stealing from the rest of the country's citizens who had remained true to their ethnicity. I suspect that, like all the other tribes in the country, the majority of “Kenya tribe” members are not actually crooks and embezzlers, even if they are lucky enough to experience the comforts of upper middle class existence.
A friend in Kajiado North, whose father is a Maasai and mother a Kikuyu told me recently that he prefers to identify himself as Kenyan, rather that as one or the other. He's a more urban, cosmopolitan fellow. In some of the more rural areas where I spend my time, people may employ different tribal labels, especially if they have mixed ethnicity, and even more so if they command multiple languages. In Maasai, most often children are identified by the ethnic background of their father. Thus, people with a Maasai father and Kikuyu mother would easily be called Maasai, even if they have a Kikuyu name and limited skill with the Maa language. When pressed, those same people might be identified as 'really' Kikuyu, or 'half-caste' (a rather ugly term, given its historical associations in other parts of Africa, but the common translation employed when people use English). People have long memories, and this may be partly due to the importance of kinship, clanship, and similar social relations. Even if they have to go back three or more generations to find the source of difference, people can often reveal that someone you assume is 'Maasai original' is really a Kikuyu, despite his livelihood, style of dress, body modifications, and use of language.
The Kenya tribe, however, is still a minority in the country, as are the rest of the country's ethnic groups. By no means are they a majority even in Nairobi, which may be considered their 'ethnic homeland.' Town is a very cosmopolitan place, with people from around the country, even around the world (plenty of major NGOs have their regional or continental headquarters here, including several branches of the UN). While their ranks will most likely grow over time, with more education, economic prosperity, and – though I dislike the word – 'modernization,' in rural areas and poorer neighbourhoods or larger towns and cities, tribe is likely to maintain its salience as a mode of organizing social relations. If people moving from rural to urban areas take up residence with or close to relatives or people from their 'home' areas, even when people from various ethnic groups and areas come to live in estates, slums, and neighbourhoods, tribe will remain an important criteria for identifying friends, spouses, and people on whom to depend in times of hardship.
The project of nation-building in Kenya, which has in some ways been thwarted by political and economic tribalism amongst the elite (or multiple elites), has a long ways to go, though the strongest reaction to the events of the past week have been to express shock and proclaim that Kenya is bigger than any single Kenyan. I haven't yet heard mention of Kenya being bigger than any single tribe, but perhaps that goes without saying. The potential to overcome popular tribalism in Kenya is probably largest in cosmopolitan centres, such as Nairobi, where no single ethnic group can easily claim an ancestral right. In other parts of the country, even where cosmopolitan centres spring up, there is often a local ethnic group, becoming more and more marginalized from economic and political gain as 'outsiders' move in, set up businesses, and take over local governance through rule by numbers. It is such places where the myth of nationalism seems thinnest.
*
Calling Kenya's current situation one of ethnic cleansing, or even genocide, is on one hand a form of hyperbolic political rhetoric, directed against political rivals to try to discredit them in the eyes of both domestic and international audiences, whose attention has no become sharply focused on Kenya. In fact, despite many rumours about ethnic gangs and a few disgusting, but relatively isolated incidents, much of the displacement of various members of ethnic groups from their homes in areas where they're perceived to be 'outsiders' is about a sense of fear at the potential escalation of current looting and burning rampages. While Kenya's current crisis seems to be retaking its intended shape as a political crisis, there is no denying that an undercurrent of ethnic tension in the country has been exposed once again.
Unfortunately, if the trend continues, that current will once again sink below the surface, hidden from immediate consciousness, but ever present. As far as long-term change and solution of the 'ethnic problem,' this may be the worst thing that can happen. Once the violence has subsided, business returns to normal, and people rebuild their houses and lives, Kenya's ethnic tension will once again be a deniable feature of social life here. Political, elite tribalism will continue to exist, and eventually public complaints will be made once again. Popular tribalism will also continue to exist, exposing itself in the form of jokes about the stereotypes of various ethnic groups, or in drunken or angry rants. This is unfortunate because, rather than moving the country towards a more sustainable peace built around a multi-ethnic society, it will return Kenya to an unsteady truce built around the myth of nationality, which is relevant to only a small portion of the population, themselves mainly an elite class. These fault lines, unproblematic as long as they remain dormant, will inevitably flare up when pressure at the local and national level align leading to localized skirmishes, destruction of property and life through a kind of normalized mass murder in which each side spills and loses blood.
Keeping ethnicity in the closet, as it were seems to be a product of the fear of what might happen, based on the example of other countries both in Africa and around the world. And in a way, perhaps maintaining an almost institutional silence about the issue does prevent it from getting out of hand; when tensions build, sporadic eruptions relieve them, in a less destructive way overall than a cataclysmic event such as genocide or civil war. But I wonder at the possibility of opening Kenya's ethnic stresses for inspection and resolution. Raila and ODM have been pushing the idea of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation for Kenya, mainly with regard to cases of grand corruption, but also linked to some of the land issues that have been perpetrated over more than 100 years.
That kind of process can not be easy, and will necessarily be painful for many involved, both those guilty of taking advantage and those who have lost out. It may be, however, that controlled release of tension, channeling the usual stress away from violent outbursts and towards mutual understanding and forgiveness, could both strengthen the nation and allow for more constructive ethnic pride. This, of course, requires the willingness of both elite and average Kenyans, and an ability to confront ethnicity openly. Undoubtedly, for many people it is easier to sweep the pain away and forget about it until the next ugly incident occurs, reminding citizens that Kenya is indeed a divided society.
*
There have been allegations that the 'ethnic' violence witnessed in places such as Eldoret, perhaps Narok, and elsewhere has been a result of people targeting Kikuyu residents because of their ethnic connection with the inaugurated president and his clique of advisers. This rings somehow hollow. It is true that there are some, maybe even many, Kenyans who would apply the adage 'when in Rome, do as the Romans do' to politics, demanding that 'outsiders' vote for 'locals' or the preferred candidates of locals in any and all elections. However, the main political issue in the aftermath of the 2007 General Election has not been that 'outsiders' overpowered 'locals' at the polls, electing their own representatives from bottom to top. Rather, the political issue has been rigging of the final presidential tally at the ECK headquarters in Nairobi, after accurate results were announced, first at each polling station and then at each constituency tallying centre. To conflate the residents who may or may not have voted for Kibaki and his allies with the criminal elite which assumed Kenyans, and especially the opposition were too ignorant or complacent to notice what was going on is a particular brand of intellectual blindness, and it may also be part of the problem. The more central problem, and the one which threatens to hinder Kenya's growth and internal peace, is the chronic popular tribalism combined with political and economic tribalism which is so easily ignored or denied until it blows up in the face of the nation.
With longer-term, localized conflicts, such as the ones in Mt Elgon, and this year in Kuresoi, it is too easy to pass them off as anomalies rather than recognizing them as symptoms of a systematic social illness whose root causes need to be addressed for Kenya to become a healthy nation. Perhaps this particular reminder, coming suddenly and breaking out in geographically distant places, will push the country past the convenience of forgetting.
Friday, January 4, 2008
the Orange Tsunami
Nairobi appears to be quiet today. Media reports are saying that the planned ODM rally doesn't seem to be happening, as, so far, people are not heading into the city in large numbers. Police are still blocking off Uhuru Park though.
BBC and others speculate that the appeal for mass protests is no longer there. That's one possibility. The other is that there's confusion about when the rally will happen. ODM officials announced 3 different dates yesterday, first 'next week', then 'saturday', then 'tomorrow, friday.' It would be very Kenyan for a mass political movement to flounder due to miscommunication and confusion.
Kibaki's apparent rejection of international involvement also appears to have changed. Reports say that he's meeting with Desmond Tutu right now. This after yesterday's speech in which he - if you listen between the words - blamed the ODM for the violence and promised to meet them only after 'the political temperature' dropped and violence stopped.
It may be that the riots, looting, killing, and forced movement have made ODM's task much more difficult. So much attention has been focused on stopping the fighting before it gets out of hand, and rightly so, that it appears to have distracted popular attention away from the fact that virtually everyone has stated that the announced results of the presidential race are fraudulent. Unlike other popular movements in which vote-rigging incumbents are ousted by mass protests, the Kenyan Orange revolution may be stopped before it starts. Odinga's Orange Tsunami washed over Kenya on election day, but he needs a new metaphor if peaceful protests are going to change the officially announced presidential result.
One problem is that here in Kenya, I suspect it's difficult to get a long-term public protest rolling, at least if the model is something like Ukraine's Orange Revolution. The first issue is to get people to believe that they won't be mowed down by excited and excitable police. For many Kenyans, even if they do strongly believe in the issue, the risk of life and/or limb may deter them from showing up. So far, the government (let's call them that, just for argument's sake) has been able to use this to good effect. Police and GSU lines have been a strong deterrent. People are pushing them, or at least they did yesterday, but only to the point of warning shots being fired, tear gas and water cannons being unleashed. Restraint on the part of the police yesterday was commendable. If the police can control the crowds that way, the rallies will never happen.
The kind of mass demonstration that ODM wants to use first require a core group to get established in Uhuru Park. Once that has been acheived, more and more Kenyans will join. To do that, however, they're going to need police cooperation to allow the rally to take place. Not easy at the best of times, and especially now with rioting and violence such an extremely easy excuse to deny permission.
So, what if the outcry over electoral fraud dies down? Will Kenyans just accept it and forget what happened between December 25th and 31st that spawned this weeks chaos? For the sake of justice, I hope not. And I can't imagine Raila and the rest of the Pentagon backing down from their claims, especially with so much obvious international and Kenyan support for at least a retallying of the vote, or even a re-run of the presidential race.
BBC and others speculate that the appeal for mass protests is no longer there. That's one possibility. The other is that there's confusion about when the rally will happen. ODM officials announced 3 different dates yesterday, first 'next week', then 'saturday', then 'tomorrow, friday.' It would be very Kenyan for a mass political movement to flounder due to miscommunication and confusion.
Kibaki's apparent rejection of international involvement also appears to have changed. Reports say that he's meeting with Desmond Tutu right now. This after yesterday's speech in which he - if you listen between the words - blamed the ODM for the violence and promised to meet them only after 'the political temperature' dropped and violence stopped.
It may be that the riots, looting, killing, and forced movement have made ODM's task much more difficult. So much attention has been focused on stopping the fighting before it gets out of hand, and rightly so, that it appears to have distracted popular attention away from the fact that virtually everyone has stated that the announced results of the presidential race are fraudulent. Unlike other popular movements in which vote-rigging incumbents are ousted by mass protests, the Kenyan Orange revolution may be stopped before it starts. Odinga's Orange Tsunami washed over Kenya on election day, but he needs a new metaphor if peaceful protests are going to change the officially announced presidential result.
One problem is that here in Kenya, I suspect it's difficult to get a long-term public protest rolling, at least if the model is something like Ukraine's Orange Revolution. The first issue is to get people to believe that they won't be mowed down by excited and excitable police. For many Kenyans, even if they do strongly believe in the issue, the risk of life and/or limb may deter them from showing up. So far, the government (let's call them that, just for argument's sake) has been able to use this to good effect. Police and GSU lines have been a strong deterrent. People are pushing them, or at least they did yesterday, but only to the point of warning shots being fired, tear gas and water cannons being unleashed. Restraint on the part of the police yesterday was commendable. If the police can control the crowds that way, the rallies will never happen.
The kind of mass demonstration that ODM wants to use first require a core group to get established in Uhuru Park. Once that has been acheived, more and more Kenyans will join. To do that, however, they're going to need police cooperation to allow the rally to take place. Not easy at the best of times, and especially now with rioting and violence such an extremely easy excuse to deny permission.
So, what if the outcry over electoral fraud dies down? Will Kenyans just accept it and forget what happened between December 25th and 31st that spawned this weeks chaos? For the sake of justice, I hope not. And I can't imagine Raila and the rest of the Pentagon backing down from their claims, especially with so much obvious international and Kenyan support for at least a retallying of the vote, or even a re-run of the presidential race.
Yesterday's news, today.
Kiserian, January 4, 2008
Yesterday's news, today.
The terrible mess that I expected would happen as ODM supporters tried to make their way to Uhuru Park yesterday for a rally did not occur. There were clashes with police, but mainly with tear gas and water cannons, rather than live ammunition, being used on the police side. Both the security personnel and the protesters showed great restraint, and from all reports I've seen injuries and deaths were kept to a minimum.
It was tense in the morning, as reports started to come in that youths were marching from Kibera to try to get to Uhuru Park. They met police and engaged in a stand off near City Mortuary, at the junction of Ngong Road and Mbagathi Way. Pictures on the TV showed a reasonable sized group of youths slowly moving towards a barricade and police line, chanting “amani” (peace). Then the police fired dozens of rounds into the air. The crowd retreated slightly before holding its ground. The chants had now change to “niue” (kill me).
A man standing behind Steve and I in Ngong, where we were watching live reports, says “watachoka” (they'll get tired), as we watch the footage from Kibera. Steve tells me the man is 'death himself' and has the blood of too many people on his hands. He's a former Mungiki leader who now lives in a more comfortable house in a Nairobi suburb. Rumour has it he was in Bulbul on the 2nd, offering money and transport to young Kikuyu men to go to Kibera to fight. I didn't get a good look at him, so I couldn't confirm his identity, nor have I heard more about Mungiki in Kibera.
Also in the morning, reports begin to come in that another group is assembling on Thika Road, trying to enter the city. They carry branches and twigs, signs of peace. Police, at first, reason with them, discouraging them from entering town. Cars still pass on Thika Road, into the city. The crowd continues to grow, with chants of 'we want peace' 'amani' and 'haki yetu' (it's our right). Eventually police become more forceful, as the protesters block off one entire side of the dual carriageway. They are dispersed and chased into the bush on the side of the road.
Police close down all roads into the city. Workers who had tried to go to work are sent away by their employers and by the police, citing the planned ODM rally and expected violence. The Nairobi Stock Exchange opened for an hour or two, with very low trading volume, and was then closed. The Kenya shilling appears to have lost a lot of value. On Dec 24, the last day of trading before the election and all this chaos, it was going for around 62 shillings per US Dollar. Now it's closer to 68, which is, however, near average for most of the past year. Currency trading may be suspended to prevent major losses.
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, is in the country and meeting with ODM Pentagon members at Orange House, as of 10:00 am Thursday. The Pentagon reiterates that they will proceed to Uhuru Park once they finish their meeting with the man they hope can help to mediate the crisis as an impartial, international figure. President Kibaki, according to PNU sources, has no plan to meet with Tutu or any other international mediator, saying that this is a Kenyan issue and must be settled internally.
Later in the day, ODM leaders are seen at the front of a large column of marchers, trying to make their way to the venue for the planned meeting. Najib Balala, William Ruto, and Joe Nyaga are clearly visible. They chant “we want peace, we want peace.” Thirty seconds of footage is repeated on the Kenyan stations, cutting off just a second after gunshots are heard. Police firing into the air to disperse the marchers.
Later, Joe Nyaga is seen proclaiming that “this is a sad day for Kenya.” PNU, he says, has not won, but ODM is making a tactical retreat, in the interests of peace, and will go back to Uhuru Park next week. They will make a fresh application to the police to hold their rally and word quickly spreads that Tuesday, Jan 8, will be the chosen day. Later, this is revised to Saturday, January 5, and then again to today, Friday, Jan 4.
In addition to protesters shown demanding 'haki yetu' (our right) and 'amani' (peace), others are shown in different parts of the country shouting 'no peace, no peace' and others saying 'no Raila, no peace.' It's unclear to me from the images who they are supporting, where they are, or what they mean by that.
Phone calls in the morning from residents of various parts of the city report to radio station Kiss 100 that it's hard to get transport into town today, so even if they want to go to work, they can't. In Eastlands, someone calls from Komarock Estate, saying that they're effectively trapped at home. No matatus to get to town, and rumours of a vigilante group roaming the streets.
At Mlango Kubwa, there are rumours of heavily-armed Mungiki sect members wearing police uniformsand patrolling the streets. Leaflets have apparently been circulated threatening violence against 'a certain community.' This is one of the frustrating things about Kenyan media. They don't like to openly discuss ethnic conflict by using the names of the groups involved. Quite possibly, this is because they will be shut down by the government for inciting hatred if they were to mention tribes by name in that context.
Police Commissioner Hussein Ali goes to Eldoret to inspect the scene of violent clashes. I walk away frm the TV as he's climbing onto the top of a car to address a crowd. I'm sure he's got a nice message of peace for them, probably mentioning how the police have restored order in most of the country, etc.
Later in the day, Amos Wako, Attorney General, issues a statement entitled “National Crisis.” Predictably he calls for peace, but most interestingly he calls for an independent body to ugrently inspect the relevant forms used in tallying the results for the election. While a recount of ballots is out, and apparently the 72-hour period in which a recount could reverse the results leaving electoral court as the only legal option, Wako feels that a retallying could legally be done to help ascertain the truth and restore order. ODM supporters say that it's even too late for that, and that there is evidence that the relevant paperwork is already being forged and the originals destroyed, to maintain the status quo in the event of a recount.
Kibaki finally addresses the nation. Media stations become excited about him breaking his long silence (characteristic of Kibaki's governing style) in what they hope will be a strong and conciliatory speech to bring order and make the first steps in restoring peace. When he speaks, he persists with his current stand. He's very sorry (in the Kenyan sense of sympathy, not culpability) about the violence and loss of life, but blames it squarely on people who are refusing to follow the law. He doesn't mention anyone or any specific incident by name, but it is clear he's referring to ODM. He indicates a willingness to talk to other parties in the dispute 'once political temperatures have cooled down enough for productive conversation,' but not before. This speech, in my opinion, will do very little to bring the sides together in any sort of negotiation for a solution.
Foreign envoys continue to call for peace, calm, and order. The EU openly asks for a government of national unity, bringing together both sides to rule the country until a more permanent solution can be found. The US, denying that Condoleeza Rice has agreed with Javier Solana on the issue, issues a statement calling for Kenyans to pursue discussions on a way forward. The British High Commissioner warns his citizens to stay indoors, and that all but essential travel to Kenya should be postponed. He reminds them to stay away from any political meeting or mass gathering, because these can quickly turn violent. The head of the African Union, Ghanaian President John Kufour, another potential mediator, waits in Ghana for an official invitation from the Kenyan government to come help with the situation. Until he receives an invitation, he's not allowed to come for a state visit or such political work. The invitation does not appear forthcoming, since the PNU group has consistently denied a need for international help. So far, the only leader I've heard openly supporting Kibaki is Yoweri Museveni, of Uganda, who congratulated him on victory yesterday.
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